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Abstract
This thesis is a collection of three essays on education and health in developing countries.
Chapter 1 shows that increasing perceived returns to education strengthens incentives for
schooling when agents underestimate the actual returns. I conducted a field experiment in
Madagascar to study alternative ways to provide additional information about the returns to
education. I randomly assigned schools to the role model intervention, the statistics intervention,
or a combination of both. I find that providing statistics reduced the large gap between perceived
returns and the statistics provided. As a result, it improved average test scores and student
attendance. For those whose initial perceived returns were below the statistics, test scores
improved by 0.37 standard deviations. Seeing a role model of poor background has a larger
impact on poor children's test scores than seeing someone of rich background. The key
implication of my results is that households lack information, but are able to process new
information and change their decisions in a sophisticated manner.
Chapter 2, joint work with Gerard Lassibille, evaluates several interventions in Madagascar
that sought to promote top-down and local monitoring of the school to improve education quality.
Randomly selected school districts and subdistricts received operational tools to facilitate their
supervision tasks. Randomly selected schools in these treated districts were reinforced with
teacher tools and parent-teacher meetings centered around a school report card. We find little
impact of targeting district and sub-district administrators. Meanwhile, the intervention
implemented at the school level improved some of the teachers' behaviors and student
attendance. Student test scores also improved by 0.1 standard deviations after two years. These
results suggest that beneficiary monitoring is more effective than mediated control in the hands of
government bureaucrats in this context.
Chapter 3 studies informal payments to doctors and nurses for inpatient health care in
Vietnam. Exploiting within-hospital variation, I find that acute patients, despite having a
presumably higher benefit of treatment, are 8 percentage points less likely to pay bribes, and pay
less, than non-acute patients. One plausible interpretation is that doctors might face existing
incentives against neglecting acute cases. I find that the differential payment by acute status is
larger in central locations (expected to be well-monitored) and at facilities that receive more audit
visits. Overall, these findings may be a sign of bureaucrats responding to incentives, even in a
highly corruptible environment.
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Chapter 1
Information, Role Models and Perceived Returns to
Education: Experimental Evidence from Madagascar
1.1 Introduction
Universal primary enrollment is one of the Millennium Development Goals, and many countries,
especially those in Africa, have devoted substantial efforts to attaining this objective. Nonetheless,
low schooling persists even though market returns to education appear to be high and direct costs
are low.' For example, in Madagascar, the estimated returns to one extra year in primary and
secondary school are 5% and 12%, respectively. Primary education is free; yet, 40% of children
entering first grade actually complete five years of primary school. Only half of those children
who complete primary school continue on to secondary school. Even when children are enrolled,
low learning, as reflected in the 63% pass rate at the primary-cycle examination, is an important
concern (Tan 2005). In addition to low achievements, widespread student absenteeism during the
school year suggests low effort on students' part.
While there can be several explanations for low schooling such as credit constraints, high dis-
count rates, or low school quality,2 I focus on another possibility: an information gap between
perceived returns to schooling (what people consider to be the returns) and actual returns. Such a
gap can exist due to costly gathering of information in isolated areas of developing countries. My
paper documents this information gap in rural Madagascar. Households appear to have imperfect
information about earnings associated with different levels of education, even in the presence of
heterogenous returns. They will choose low education when they think the return is low (Foster and
'Psacharopoulos (1985) and Psacharopoulos (1994) estimate the returns to be high in many developing countries.
2For example, Oreopoulos (2003) explores the possible role of high discount rates in the decision of high-school
dropouts. See Glewwe and Kremer (2005) for a more complete review.
Rosenzweig (1996) and Bils and Klenow (2000)). Thus, we would expect that increasing perceived
returns can strengthen incentives for schooling for those who may have initially underestimated the
returns.
Once we know there is imperfect information about the returns to education, the next important
step is to examine how to provide useful additional information. One straightforward way is to
provide statistics. The downside of this approach is that a largely illiterate population may not
effectively process statistical numbers. An alternative way of informing households of the benefits
of education is through a "role model," i.e. an actual person sharing his success story. This policy
choice has been more popular than presenting numbers (for example, UNICEF has role model
programs in various developing countries). Role models can be effective simply because stories
are powerful, or because they contain information. Wilson (1987) proposes that role models bring
back missing information about the upside distribution of returns to education. The impact of
observing a role model will depend on how households update their beliefs based on the information
the role model brings. Ray (2004) suggests that role models might be powerful only when they
come from a similar background and, therefore, carry information relevant to the audience.3
My paper sheds further light on how to provide additional information about the returns to
education. I ask the following three questions: (i) Are households' perceived returns to education
different from the estimated average return, due to heterogeneity entirely or also imperfect infor-
mation? (ii) How do households update beliefs when presented with statistics about the average
return or with a specific role model? (iii) How do children adjust their efforts in response to the
change in perceived returns? To address these questions, I first administered a survey in rural
Madagascar to measure parents' perceived returns for their child and perceived returns for the
average person in the population.4 I then conducted a field experiment in 640 primary schools, in
3Discussions on role models have featured both in the policy environment and in the academic literature. Most
of the evidence to date focuses on a "mentoring" role model; for example, a teacher of the same race has a positive
impact on a student's test scores (Dee 2004). My work studies a role model's informational effect, i.e. how people
update beliefs based on the information the role model brings.
4This survey methodology follows the literature in the US on measuring perceived returns to education. Manski
conjunction with the Madagascar Ministry of Education. The experimental design was motivated
by a model of schooling decisions with heterogeneous returns and uncertainty about the return to
education. When an agent is presented with the statistics, he updates his belief about the average
return. When presented with a role model, he infers that heterogeneity in the returns to education
is high, making the statistical estimate of the average return less relevant. Thus, role models will
undermine the impact of the statistics intervention. The agent also infers from the role model's
background that individuals from this background receive relatively high returns to education on
average.
To test the theory's key predictions, I randomly assigned schools into three main treatment
groups. In the "statistics" schools, teachers reported to parents and children the average earnings
at each level of education, as well as the implied gain. The second intervention sent a role model
to share with students and families his/her family background, educational experience, and current
achievements. To investigate the proposition that a role model from the same background carries
relevant information, I randomly assigned a role model of poor or rich background to different
schools. The third treatment combines both the statistics and role model interventions together,
investigating the possibility that role models may undermine statistics. I collected endline data on
perceived returns, student attendance, and test scores to evaluate the impact of the interventions
on beliefs and on effort at school roughly five months later.
I find that parents' median perceived return matches the average return estimated from house-
hold survey data. Nonetheless, there is a lot of dispersion in both perception of the average return
and perception of the child's own return. There are two possible explanations for dispersion in
perception of the child's own return: heterogeneity in the actual returns and imperfect informa-
tion. I argue that while heterogeneity plays a role, some extent of imperfect information exists, as
(1992) first brought this topic to attention by proposing that youths infer the returns from their sample of observations.
Several papers have surveyed college students in the US for their perceptions of incomes associated with different
educational levels: Betts (1996), Dominitz and Manski (1996), Avery and Kane (2004). Most find that American
students estimate quite well the mean earnings for a cohort, and think they would earn slightly better than the mean.
reflected in the larger dispersion in perception than in the real distribution of earnings.
The main results of the experiment match the model's predictions. Participants who received
the statistics intervention updated their perceived returns. Providing statistics significantly de-
creases the gap between perceived returns and the estimated average return provided. This result
holds for both perception of the average return and perception of one's own return. It suggests
that part of the dispersion in perceived returns comes from imperfect information. Once house-
holds update their perceived returns, schooling decisions consequently respond. The statistics
intervention improved average test scores by 0.2 standard deviations, only a few months later. For
those whose initial perceived returns were below the statistics, test scores improved by 0.37 stan-
dard deviations. Student attendance in statistics schools is also 3.5 percentage points higher than
attendance in schools without statistics.
The role model interventions offer very interesting results. By themselves, role models have
small effects on average, but people seem to care about the information the role model brings. In
particular, consistent with the theory, the role model's background matters. The role model from
a poor background improved average test scores by 0.17 standard deviations, while the role model
from a rich background had no impact. Moreover, this positive impact of poor-background role
models on average test scores mainly reflects their influence on the poor (0.27 standard deviations).
Again as the theory predicts, combining a role model with statistics undoes the effects of statistics.
The role model may indicate high underlying heterogeneity in individual returns, implying that
the statistics were imprecisely estimated. Thus, households do not update as much based on the
statistics as they would otherwise.
These results have strong implications. First, households update their perception in a sophis-
ticated way based on the information provided. Second, schooling investment seems responsive
to changes in perceived returns. Third, in terms of policies to improve education in developing
countries, providing statistical information can be a cost-effective instrument to enhance children's
efforts at school, in contexts where individuals underestimate the returns. A quick back-of-the-
envelope calculation using my results shows that the statistics intervention would cost 2.30 USD for
an additional year of schooling and 0.04 USD for additional 0.10 standard deviations in test scores
(cheaper than any prior programs evaluated with a randomized design). Lastly, when households
do have correct perception of the returns on average, the results from this paper suggest that mar-
ket interventions to improve the overall returns are an important way to increase school attendance
and test scores.
Some existing evidence already shows that the provision of information may affect individual
behaviors, such as Dupas (2006). In particular, Jensen (2007) demonstrates from a field experiment
in the Dominican Republic that providing students with mean earnings by education led to a 4
percentage point increase in the probability of returning to school the following year. My work
builds on this result along two fronts. First, I test whether statistics given to the parents affects
the intensive margin of schooling-student attendance and test scores. Second, in terms of the
research question, I study whether role models are effective in changing behaviors, either through
their success story or through the relevance of their information. Addressing this research question
would provide more depth to our understanding of how people update their belief.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses a model of schooling decisions
under Bayesian updating of perceived returns. In Section 1.3, I describe the field experiment: the
statistics and role model programs, as well as the evaluation design. Section 1.4 discusses the data.
Section 1.5 gives an overview of perceived returns to education at baseline, and then presents the
estimation strategy and results. The final section concludes.
1.2 A Model of Schooling with Uncertainty about the Return to
Education
To assess the conditions under which the statistics and role model programs may plausibly affect
decisions, this paper integrates a simple framework of schooling with Bayesian updating about
the return to education. This theory builds on the standard Card (1999) model of school choice
with heterogeneity in individual returns to education. Here I formalize the possibility that agents
measure their own return as well as the average return with errors. As a result, I explore two
features of learning.
First, this section models learning about the average return to education. I show that agents
update their estimate after observing the government's statistic on the average return. How much
they update depends on their belief about the precision of the government's estimate. When
there is high heterogeneity in individual returns in the population, the government's estimate of
the average return is less precise. In that case, agents should put less weight on this statistic.
Second, an agent also learns about the relationship between his type and his return to education,
above and beyond the population's average return. He infers this information from observing the
government's choice of role model programs. School investment decisions are then made based on
the posterior belief about the return to education.
1.2.1 Model Setup
Consider individual schooling choice under heterogeneous returns to education. An individual i has
the following preferences 5
EU = Ei In yi(ei) - ci(ei) (1.1)
where log earnings is a linear function of education Inyi(ei) = ai + biei and ci(ei) denotes an
increasing and convex cost function of education. In the standard model of investment in human
capital, ei represents years of schooling. Here I examine effort behaviors of children already enrolled
in school. I refer to ei as child effort in schooling, but the general intuition from the standard
5I abstract from risk aversion here. Modeling log earnings as concave in the return to education bi does not
change the nature of updating perception.
model remains. The optimal choice of effort solves the first-order condition
Ei[bi] = c:(ei) (1.2)
Given that marginal cost is increasing in ei, the optimal choice of effort will increase if the individual
expects higher returns.
The individual's true return to education is determined by the actual average return in the
population and by some heterogeneity factors (observable and unobservable characteristics)
bi = b + Xi/ + Ei (1.3)
where b denotes the actual average return in the population; for example, when the whole economy
is doing better, everyone has higher returns. Xi is some observable characteristic that affects one's
own return, such as parental wealth (rich or poor background). The last term ei captures any
heterogeneity unobserved to others and only known by the individual, such as ability. Let ei be
normally distributed ei - N(O, a ).
Uncertainty about one's own return comes from two sources: imperfect knowledge of the av-
erage return (b) and that of the relationship between his characteristics and his own return (y).
First, assume as in the Bayesian approach that the individual's belief can be described as a prior
distribution on the actual average return b - N(bo, C ). His perceived average return is Ei[b] =- bo =
b + ±i. Second, he does not perfectly observe y either: Ei[7] = y + rli. What determines the effort
decision is the individual's expected return
Ei [b] = Ei [b] + Ei[Xi7] + ei (1.4)
Perceived Self Perceived Average
= (b + Xiy + E) + (i + Xi?) (1.5)
Actual return for Self Errors
With this framework in mind, the next subsection models how individuals update their perceived
return after the statistics and role model interventions.
1.2.2 Updating Based on Statistics
Suppose the government receives a noisy signal about the average return bc = b + (G. The
government's noise is normally distributed (G - N(0, o-2), i.e. the precision of its signal is 1/.g
The government provides this statistic be to all agents. As the individual sees the government
statistic about the average return, he will update his estimate of the average return toward that
number. Bayesian updating leads to a normal posterior distribution (DeGroot 1970), with the
following mean and variance
aE b bo=+ 2 b (1.6)
2 2
E[baIbG] = G (1.7)
92 2Vari[blbG]= 2 G2 (1.
o + UG
The individual's posterior perceived average return is a weighted average of his prior and the
government statistic. The weight depends on the precision of the government's signal: if U2 is
small, the posterior becomes very close to the statistic. To elaborate, suppose the government's
signal bG comes from random sampling of n observations in the population. The variance of its
estimate is 2G = -, where s2 is an estimate of the population variance. That is, the government's
signal is less precise when there is high underlying heterogeneity in the population. I will return
to this point later when I discuss heterogeneity in more detail.
According to expression 1.4, agents will also update their own expected return toward the
statistic. For people who had initially underestimated the average return (bo < bc), their perceived
return increases, resulting in higher effort e. However, one's relative position to the average
Ei [XX<] + ei is still unchanged.
1.2.3 Updating Based on Role Models
The next step is to examine how individuals update their belief after seeing a role model. The
role model is simply one observation from the distribution and should not affect beliefs unless this
person carries a signal about the return to education. I need to model explicitly what an individual
thinks the role model is supposed to signal and why the government chooses to send information
in this way. A useful framework in which role models might plausibly affect behaviors is a game
between the government and an individual. I formalize individuals' beliefs about the programs
and their behaviors in a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Recall that each agent is uncertain about
the relationship between his characteristics and his own return (-y). Here a welfare-maximizing
government receives a signal about this relationship. Through its role model programs, it conveys
the information to people.
First, let me specify the observable characteristic Xi to be the individual's type. Suppose
there is a continuum of agents of measure 1. There are 2 types H and L (born rich and poor).
One's type is unknown to other individuals but observable to the government. Perceived return
in expression 1.4 can now be written as
Ei[bi] = Ei[b] + E(QH) * H + E( yL) * L + Ei (1.8)
where H and L are dummies for each corresponding type. Without loss of generality, I look at an
L-type individual throughout the rest of the model. He does not observe 'YL perfectly.
There are 3 states of nature with varying individual return. The "low heterogeneity" state
occurs with probability 1 - q, in which case returns to education do not depend on one's type, i.e.
YH =- L = 0. I call this state "low heterogeneity" since heterogeneity in individual returns in
the population comes solely from unobservable (a,) rather than from both observable and unob-
servable characteristics. Alternatively, when there is high heterogeneity (with probability q), this
heterogeneity favors one type. In the good state ("good" from the L-type's point of view), being of
type L affects the return positively 'YL = 72 > 0 while being of type H affects the return negatively
'H '71 < 0. Symmetrically, in the bad state, 7L = 71 < 0 and TH = 72 > 0. There is uncertainty
about the state. The probability of high heterogeneity is q , and the probability of the good state
given high heterogeneity o0 .
Definition 1 After the payoff is realized, anyone with income above a threshold y is considered to
be successful ("role model").
Consider a static game between 2 players: a welfare-maximizing government and a low-type
individual. The timing is as follows. Nature first decides on low or high heterogeneity. Under high
heterogeneity, nature decides which type has the higher return (good or bad state for the L-type).
The government knows exactly which state it is. The government decides whether to send a role
model-example of success, and which type to send. The individual sees the government's action
and infers information about the state. He then updates beliefs about the return using Bayes' rule,
and chooses the optimal level of effort. The extensive form of the game is displayed in Appendix
Figure 1.
1.2.3.1 Individual's Problem
Given the prior beliefs, a low-type individual's expected rate of return is
Ei[bi] = Ei [b] + 4q 072 + q(1 - po)Yi + Ei (1.9)
His choice of e solves
eo = arg max{[Ei[b] + qfoz0 2 + q(1 - Po)71 + ei]e - ci(e)} (1.10)
The efficient choices of education for the low-type are as follows.
In the low heterogeneity state:
elowhet = arg max{ [Ei [b] + ei]e - ci(e)} (1.11)
In the good state:
egood = arg max{[E [b] + + ei]e - ci(e)} (1.12)
In the bad state:
ead = arg max{[Ei [b] + -y + ei]e - ci (e)} (1.13)
1.2.3.2 Government
The welfare-maximizing government receives a fully informative signal of what the state is. It
wants to choose an action to signal to the low-type agent about the state so that he can make the
efficient choice of effort. The government wants the individual's choice to be as close as possible to
the efficient choice. Consider the government's set of possible strategies g E {Nobody, L, H}, which
represents sending nobody, sending a low-type role model, or sending a high-type role model.
Given a signal status s E {Lowhet, Good, Bad}, the government's objective function is
minle(g) - e*(s)I (1.14)
g(s)
where e(g) is the response function of the low-type after observing the government's action g. e*(s)
is the efficient effort level under each of the government's information sets
e*(Lowhet) = eh• = argmax{[Ei[b] + ei]e - ci(e)} (1.15)
e*(Good) - e*ood = argmax{[Ei[b] + 72 + ei]e - ci(e)} (1.16)
e*(Bad) - ead = argmax{[Ei[b] +1 + ei]]e - ci(e)} (1.17)
1.2.3.3 Equilibrium Concept (Benchmark Model)
Proposition 2 The following strategies and beliefs constitute a (pure-strategy) Perfect Bayesian
equilibrium.
Government's strategy g(s): g(Lowhet) = Nobody, g(Good) = L, g(Bad) = H
Low-type individual's strategy e(g): e(Nobody) = elowhet, e(L) = egood, e(H) = ead
Individual beliefs at his decision node:
probability[Lowhetlg = Nobody] = 1
probability[Goodlg = L] = 1
probability[Badlg = H] = 1
Proof. We need to show that each strategy is the best response given the other party's strategy,
and the beliefs are consistent with Bayes' rule.
At the final decision node, the low-type individual updates his belief on the state after observing
the government's move. Given the government's strategy, seeing g = Nobody means that the
government signals the low heterogeneity state. Given the government's equilibrium strategy,
the individual's posterior belief is probability[Lowhetlg = Nobody] = 1. The solution to his
maximization problem is elowhet (see expression 1.11). Seeing g = L implies that the state is good,
so the individual updates
prob[goodlg = L] (1.18)
p[LIgood] * q (1.19)
p[Llgood]qpo + p[LJbad]q(1 - po) + p[Lllowhet](1 - q)
S1 * qpo (1.20)
1 * ql-o + 0 * q(1 - po) + 0, (1 - q)
= 1 (1.21)
This is good news (also better news than seeing nobody) since he now thinks his return is Ei[b] +
72 + ei, and the solution to his maximization problem is egood . By similar logic, a high-type role
model is bad news to the low-type individual, and leads to ead.
Given the individual's strategy, the government solves its minimization problem as in expression
1.14. It would not deviate from the equilibrium strategy since that would cause the individual to
deviate from the efficient choice of effort. n
1.2.4 Statistics and Role Models
This subsection summarizes the predictions of updating based on statistics and on role models from
the previous two subsections, taking into consideration the effect of the combined interventions.
Now in equilibrium, sending role models implies high underlying heterogeneity in the population.
Recall that the government's statistic bc is less precise under high heterogeneity. As a consequence,
the individual puts less weight on the government's statistic when the government also sends a role
model.
The equilibrium strategies in the previous benchmark model can be extended to the following.
Government's strategy:
1. No signal about the average return, low heterogeneity state: do nothing
2. Noisy signal about the average return, low heterogeneity state: provide statistics alone
3. No signal about the average return, high heterogeneity state: send low-type role model if
good state, send high-type role model if bad state
4. Noisy signal about the average return, high heterogeneity state: provide statistics, and a role
model as in strategy 3.
Low-type individual's strategy:
1. Government does nothing: infer that it is the low heterogeneity state and choose effort ac-
cordingly
2. Statistics alone: update perceived returns Ei[b] and Ei [bi], infer that it is the low heterogeneity
state, and change effort
3. Low-type role model: infer that it is the good state and increase effort
4. High-type role model: infer that it is the bad state and decrease effort
5. Statistics and low-type role model: update perceived returns, infer that it is the good state
but put less weight on the statistics, and change effort
6. Statistics and high-type role model: update perceived returns, infer that it is the bad state
and put less weight on the statistics, and change effort
These strategies give us a set of predictions for individual behaviors under the government's
statistics and role model programs explored empirically in this paper.
1.2.5 Discussion
There are three important numbers here that will be relevant throughout the rest of the paper. The
government has a signal bc about the actual average return b, and this is the statistic it provides.
People initially do not know b and have a perceived return for the average Ei[b] - bo = b + (j.
Each individual also has expected return for his own type, i.e. a perceived return to education for
himself as in expression 1.4.
When mapped to the empirical setting, this model carries three main insights. First, it predicts
that everyone updates toward the statistic about the average return. In particular, this statistic
has the same effect for two individuals of different types who start with the same prior about the
average return. Second, seeing a role model of the same type (initial background) is good news
since this role model reveals to the agent that the heterogeneity is favorable to him. Meanwhile,
seeing a role model from a different type is bad news. Third, combining statistics with a role model
may signal high heterogeneity in the returns and undermine the impact of statistics.
The sections that follow will explore how people behave empirically when they receive the
statistics and role model programs from the government.
1.3 Study Design
Imperfect knowledge of the return, as described in section 1.2's framework, is arguably common in
many areas in developing countries. Most of rural Madagascar lies in secluded areas with limited
access to outside information, and information on earnings is not covered by the media (radio).
According to a pilot study by the Ministry of Education and UNICEF in November 2006, many local
parents have difficulties estimating the income associated with various educational attainments.
From my survey data, 73% of the respondents report that it is difficult to learn about their peers
and neighbors' income; 53% say there are frequent incidences of educated people out-migrating from
the village. These observations suggest that rural households might have considerable uncertainty
about the returns to education.
1.3.1 Description of the Intervention
To learn about behavioral responses to role models and to returns to education statistics, I designed
a field experiment to be carried out by the Ministry of Education (MENRS), with support from
the French Development Agency (AFD), UNICEF, and the World Bank. This experiment was
implemented as a government program, and households presumably responded in this context.
The government programs evaluated here were launched at mid-school year, in February 2007 (the
academic calendar in Madagascar runs from September to June).
One important feature of the design was that all participating schools organized a parent-
teacher meeting. In the comparison group, parents and teachers discussed during this meeting
any typical topics of the school.6 In the other program schools, in addition to these discussions,
6 This placebo treatment allows me to avoid confounding the effects of meetings mandated by the government
with the effects of statistics or role models. For example, I control for the potential impact coming from teachers
Grade 4 students and their parents received either the "statistics" intervention, the "role model"
intervention, or both during this meeting.
First, the "statistics" intervention sought to inform parents of the average returns to education,
calculated from the nationwide population. In this treatment, school teachers first presented a few
simple statistics based on the 2005 Madagascar Household Survey (Enquite aupres des M6nages) to
all Grade 4 students and their parents at a school meeting. For each education level, the audience
learned about the distribution of jobs by education, and the mean earnings of 25 year-old Malagasy
females and males by levels of education. Then the teacher explained the magnitude of increased
income associated with higher educational levels, therefore implying percentage gains or returns to
education. Discussion on these statistics lasted about 20 minutes. Parents also received a half-page
information card featuring mean earnings by gender and by education, and a visual demonstration
of the percentage gain (see sample card in the Appendix Figure 2). I refer to these statistics as
the estimated average returns to education (bG in the model). The numbers reported to families
are predicted values from a Mincerian regression of log wage on education levels, age, age squared,
and gender. These estimates are robust to adding region of birth fixed effects, but they may be
biased due to potential endogeneity problems. Within the experiment, people should still respond
to the new information provided that these estimates differ from their prior perception.
Second, the role model program mobilized three types of local role models to share their life
story at treated schools. In this context, a "role model" is an educated individual with high income,
who grew up in the local school district. 7 Motivated by the theoretical proposition that role models
from different backgrounds carry different information, I randomly assigned a role model of poor
or rich background to different schools. In practice, it was important to also have a role model
of moderate income, possibly the relevant level of success for certain areas. The exact types are
suddenly becoming concerned that the government is paying attention to them, or any motivation to parents from
being involved in the school.
7Existing definitions of role models vary. A broader definition of a role model refers to any example of success that
can inspire others to emulate him (Bala and Sorger 1998, Anderson and Ramsey 1990, Haveman and Wolfe 1995).
defined as follows:
* Role Model type LM (low to medium): a role model of low-income background similar to many
students in the audience (the father and mother were farmers, the role model went to the
village school, for example) who is now moderately successful (generating high productivity
on farm, or owning a profitable shop)
* Role Model type LH (low to high): a role model of low-income background similar to many
students in the audience, who is now very successful (government official or manager of a big
enterprise, earning high income).
* Role Model type HH (high to high): a role model of high-income background (father works for
government, mother is a school teacher, the role model went to a private preparatory school,
for example) who is now very successful.
Through a local committee consisting of the school district head, a local NGO leader, and
community leaders, MENRS identified and recruited 72 role models of different types between
December 2006 and January 2007. This recruitment made no explicit distinction in terms of gender
(and it turned out there were 15 female role models). UNICEF Communication Sector provided
two days of training on communication skills to the chosen role models so that they could reflect
on their personal experiences, write an abbreviated script and practice an oral presentation. This
training only guided the stories to cover at least three bases of information: background, educational
experiences, and current job and standard of living. These role models then visited selected schools
(one visit per school) and shared their life stories with all 4th-graders and their parents at a school
meeting. After the role model's speech (about 20 minutes), the meeting proceeded to questions and
answers, and open discussions. According to field reports, the topics of discussions were mostly
to clarify the role model's story, but the parents also expressed their doubts. They sometimes
cited examples of teenagers in their village with a high school degree but without a permanent job.
Most frequently, they justified the difficulties of sending children to schools during periods of food
shortages.
Finally, in the combined treatment schools, both of the above interventions took place at the
same school meeting. The school teacher first explained returns to education statistics, followed
by the role model's exposition.8 The school meetings were well-attended throughout my study
sample.
1.3.2 Sample and Evaluation Design
The study sample consists of 640 public primary schools in 16 districts throughout rural Madagascar
(see the map in Figure 1). To arrive at this study sample, I had excluded from the Ministry's
roster a few schools that are too far away and extremely difficult to access. These 640 schools were
divided into 8 groups of 80 each, to receive different combinations of the aforementioned "statistics"
intervention, role model interventions and their combinations. Treatment assignment into the 8
groups was random, stratified by students' baseline test score and AGEMAD treatment status.
AGEMAD is an on-going experiment aimed at improving management in the educational system,
which also covered all the schools in my sample (Nguyen and Lassibille 2007). 9
Table 1 describes the precise treatment design and distribution of program components. There
are 8 treatment groups (TGO to TG7). The columns represent the "role model" interventions by
type (TG2, TG3, and TG4 received a role model only). The second row represents the "statistics"
intervention (TG1 received statistics only). I define "Any Statistics" as the second-row groups of
320 schools, and "Any RM" as the 480 schools in the last three columns. TG5, TG6, and TG7 refer
to the combined treatment schools, who received both the statistics and role model treatments. In
8 Discussion on the statistics took place first to help mitigate the possibility that it might be overshadowed by the
role models.
9The AGEMAD packaged intervention provides (i) operational tools and training to administrators and teachers,
(ii) report cards and accountability meetings with a purpose to improve the alignment of incentives. This cross-
cutting design does not a priori restrict external validity since I do not expect any interactions between AGEMAD
and the treatments explored in this paper. Indeed, when I test for this interaction, the treatment effects of statistics
and role models on test scores do not vary significantly with AGEMAD status.
all program schools, Grade 4 (aged 9-15) is the only treatment cohort. Other cohorts may have
been indirectly affected since, for example, parents often have more than one child in the same
primary school.
As mentioned earlier, the comparison group (TGO) still received the placebo meeting, but
neither the statistics nor the role model interventions. Aside from the design table, 69 other
schools were randomly chosen to be "pure control". Those schools did not come into contact with
any announcement of the program, nor any baseline survey administered, nor any school meeting
organized by the program. I will compare test scores in those schools (the only data available
for this group) to those of the regular comparison group to detect any potential effect of simply
participating in the experiment: answering survey questions and attending a meeting.
This evaluation design allows me to address the main questions in this paper concerning how
individuals respond to information about the returns to education. First, TG1 versus TGO tells us
to what extent providing pure statistical information changes one's perceived returns and schooling
decisions. Second, I can measure whether role models are overall effective in changing behaviors,
or only someone of the same type has a positive impact on effort. Third, the combined treatment
schools help us understand what happens to the impact of statistics when extra information such
as a role model is also presented.
1.4 Data and Experimental Validity
1.4.1 Data
1.4.1.1 Background Data
Background information on the schools is available from administrative data collected by the Min-
istry of Education. In addition, I collected some information on household characteristics in a
parent survey in all the schools of my sample. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics at baseline
for the sample of schools and households in this study. The average primary school has around 215
students in total enrollment for Grades 1-5, and 30 students in Grade 4. From the baseline test
scores, the average student can reach 60% of the competency level they are expected to master.
Their families are mostly poor, but I will refer to the top half of income as the relative "rich"
in this sample. Less than half of the parents finished primary school, despite their high level of
self-reported literacy.
1.4.1.2 Perception of Returns to Education
Evaluation of the statistics and role model interventions rests on three main data sources collected
during the experiment: parent surveys, school attendance data, and Grade 4 students' test scores.
The first one is subjective data on beliefs, while the latter two give objective measures of schooling.
All data, except attendance, were collected for my entire sample at baseline (mid-school year) and
ex-post (at the end of the school year). The actual sample turned out to be slightly fewer than
640 schools since some did not have Grade 4 during the study period.
I designed a parent survey to measure the first outcome of interest-perceived returns to educa-
tion. This data allows us to gain a better understanding of the potential information gap at the
household. At the beginning and the end of this project, surveyors visited the homes of Grade
4 students and interviewed either parent of the child (55% of the respondents were mothers). My
survey approach follows Jensen (2007) and previous literature to elicit each individual's perceptions
of the returns to education, both for the average and for oneself. We want to measure these two
numbers since dispersion in perceived returns for oneself reflects both heterogeneity in the actual
returns and possible misperception. Dispersion in perceived average returns, on the other hand,
would reflect misperception (unless parents do not fully understand the survey question).
The exact survey question on perceived average earnings is as follows:
"Please estimate the average monthly earnings of current 25 year-old Malagasies
without a primary school degree"
The same question repeats for other scenarios of educational attainment. There are four scenar-
ios in total: no primary education, only primary education, only lower-secondary education, and
only high school education. Respondents also gave an estimate of their own child's (the Grade
4 student) income in hypothetical cases of various educational attainments, in response to two
consecutive questions:
"Suppose, hypothetically, that your child were to leave primary school without ob-
taining the CEPE [primary school degree] and not complete any more schooling. What
types of work do you think he/she might (be offered and) choose to engage in when
he/she is 25 years old?"
"How much do you think he/she will earn in a typical month at the age of 25?"
The answer to the first question is perceived job type by education. The answer to the second
question is perceived earnings by education. From respondents' perceived earnings by education, I
calculate the corresponding proportional gain in earnings due to education. I call this proportional
gain "perceived returns to education." For each child, there are three levels of perceived returns:
additional gain from primary education, lower-secondary education, and high school. For example,
the perceived return to lower-secondary school is defined as
Perceived Earnings(Secondary) - Perceived Earnings(Primary)
Perceived Earnings(Primary)
In this paper, I refer to respondents' estimates of the average returns as "perceived returns for
average," and those of the child as "perceived returns for self." I measure for each individual at
baseline his perceived returns for self and for average. Endline perceived returns to education is
individual-level data, and is name-matched to the baseline perceived returns at 75% match rate.
1.4.1.3 Schooling Outcomes
Attendance rate is measured by the ratio of students present to total enrollment, at the school-grade
level. This attendance data was collected by surveyors during unannounced school visits (one visit
per school). It is available for only a random subset of schools in the study sample. This variable
indicates whether the role model and statistics interventions entice students to exert more effort to
attend school.
Lastly, I examine students' achievement through individual test scores. The baseline and post-
tests measure children's competency in three materials: mathematics, French, and Malagasy. The
baseline test took place in February 2006, and the post-test was administered to the same children
(in Grade 4) in June 2007, as part of the AGEMAD project. Due to administrative constraints,
only a random sub-sample of 25 students maximum per school took the test. These tests were
developed from existing PASEC exams. 10 They cover basic calculations and grammar questions in
French and Malagasy, at the level that the students are supposed to master at this stage. These
tests are achievement rather than ability tests, so performance can be improved by increasing effort.
Test scores are calculated as the percentage of correct answers. Throughout the paper, I report
test scores normalized by the control group mean and standard deviation for easier comparisons
across different scales. Test score data is name-matched to the baseline perceived returns at 50%
match rate.
1.4.2 Experimental Validity
First, as expected given the randomized design, Table 3 shows that baseline test scores, school
size, and repetition rate are statistically indistinguishable across the treatment groups and the
comparison group. Columns 4 to 6 reassure that pre-existing differences in household data are
mostly insignificant as well, with low point estimates. Only baseline perceived returns for average
'OPASEC (Programme d'Analyse des Systemes Educatifs de la CONFEMEN) is a program in 15 francophone
countries that studies elements of learning for students.
seem to be different in the statistics and role model LM and LH groups.
Second, to minimize the potential bias caused by differential attrition, I tried to measure out-
come variables for all the original participants of the program. Both the baseline and endline
surveys were administered at the homes of the students just a few months apart. Any attrition
is likely to be due to practical constraints of conducting the survey, such as unfavorable weather,
rather than endogenous reasons related to the treatments themselves.
Column 1 of Table 4 presents mean attrition rates from the parent survey in all the treatment
groups. While the statistics treatment schools have quite high attrition, the differences in mean
attrition are not statistically significant. Columns 2 to 6 examine whether the differences in baseline
characteristics of schools with high and low attrition vary across treatment groups. These columns
report coefficient estimates from regressing each baseline characteristic on attrition rate interacted
with treatment group dummies. Only parental education appears different for schools of different
attrition rates across some treatment groups.
The post-test was administered to as many of the baseline children as possible. The school
director had asked children who no longer attended school to come at the day of the test; and
test administrators tried to find the absent students at home. As shown in column 7 of Table 4,
attrition rate in test score data is around 0.12 and similar across treatment groups. Column 8
shows that pretest score differences between attriters and stayers are also similar across treatment
groups, implying that attrition is not likely to be selected in terms of the pretest.
Due to time and budget constraints, attendance data is available for only a random sub-sample
of 176 schools. While the small sample size prevents very precise estimation, there should not be
any attrition bias since this sub-sample was randomly chosen.
1.5 Estimation Strategy and Results
The objective of this paper is first to understand better the distribution of initial perceived returns
to education, and how perceived returns for self and for average compare to the estimated average
return. Then, it examines the effects of statistics and different kinds of role models on perceived
returns to education and schooling outcomes. I present the findings below in that order.
1.5.1 Baseline Perceived Returns to Education
I exploit survey data on perceived jobs and perceived earnings as described in section 1.4.1.2.
Figure 2A shows the fraction of the respondents who thought their children, with various education
levels, would work in a certain sector. If everyone has the correct perception, these fractions should
match the empirical job distribution. Most parents associate higher education with jobs in the
public sector. In reality, only 33% of high school graduates work for the government while 40%
work in commerce and the private sector, a sharp contrast from the beliefs shown in this figure.
Answers to the survey question on perceived earnings reveal huge variation in parents' estimates
of the returns at baseline. First, roughly one third of the respondents do not report perceived
earnings, answering "Don't Know" to the survey question (even though almost everyone could
predict the job type and report his household income). Panel A of Table 5 presents the fraction of
the sample not knowing perceived earnings for self and for average at baseline. More respondents
claim to know earnings for higher education, perhaps since they can perceive the standard salaries
for public sector jobs but not the variable incomes in agriculture. The poor appear somewhat
more likely to answer "Don't Know" perceived earnings (also true for the less educated).
Second, conditional on knowing, perceived returns are dispersed; however, the median percep-
tion is close to the estimated average return (Mincer estimates from household survey data). Figure
2B plots the kernel densities of the empirical distribution of perceived returns. The wide dispersion
in perceived returns for self may reflect both heterogeneity in returns and imperfect information.
It is important to note that perception about the average returns also varies widely, revealing some
extent of misperception. Differences between perceived return for self and that for average, i.e. an
individual's relative position to the average, are mostly concentrated around zero.
Interestingly, in all cases, the median perceptions are well aligned with the estimated average
returns. Despite large dispersion in perceived returns, the median of each distribution is quite close
to the vertical line denoting the estimated average return in all the graphs of Figure 2B. Panels
B and C of Table 5 report the median perceived returns and standard deviation. For example, the
median person in the full sample thinks his marginal return to lower-secondary education is 0.67,
i.e. 67% gain in income compared to completing just primary school. It is interesting to note
that the poor have higher median perceived returns, though the standard deviation is also higher.
These differences in perceived returns reflect underlying differences in perceived earnings. For all
education levels, the poor's perceived earnings are consistently lower than those of the rich (see
Panel D). Still, the poor expect to gain more from education. Poor people think they earn very
little with lower education levels but can increase earnings substantially with higher education.
The relatively rich people in my data think they can earn a fair amount even with little education.
Third, dispersion in perception appears larger than dispersion in the actual earnings recorded
in household survey data. Panels D and E of Table 5 display the mean and standard deviation
of perceived and observed earnings. The mean perceived earnings are higher, which might be
reasonable if parents already take into account growth and inflation in estimating children's earnings
in the future. The standard deviation in perception is always larger than that in the survey data,
for all levels of education. This evidence again suggests some extent of imperfect information
about the returns to education.
1.5.2 Estimation Strategy
I first ask whether the statistics program as a whole has an impact on perception and schooling
by pooling the "statistics only" and "statistics with role model" schools to be the "any statistics"
treatment. I ask the same question about the role model program as a whole. I also discuss the
impact of statistics by itself, role model program by itself, and both interventions together. The
main specifications are of the following form:
Ysi = a + "yo * AnyStat, + 6X,i + esi (1.22)
Ysi = a + "y * AnyRM, + 6Xi + esi (1.23)
Ysi = a + "Y2 * AnyStat, + "73 * AnyRM, + 74 * StatRM, + 6Xi + esi (1.24)
where Yi is an outcome variable for individual i in school s. AnyStat is a dummy equal to 1 if school
s receives any statistics treatment, and similarly AnyRM for any role model treatment. StatRM
is an indicator for the schools that received the combined interventions, i.e. the intersection of
AnyStat and AnyRM. -y's are the coefficients of interest, to be interpreted as the average treatment
effect. For example, Y2 in equation 1.24 is the difference between average Y in statistics (only)
schools and that of the comparison schools. '2 + y3 + 74 is the effect of receiving both interventions
relative to the comparison schools. Standard errors are clustered at the school level. Observations
are weighted by the probability of selection, i.e. sampling weights, so that the coefficients of
interest are estimated for the population. Xi refers to control variables in some specifications. In
most cases, I control for the baseline value of the dependent variable, which is likely to have good
explanatory power for the dependent variable and improve precision of the coefficient estimates.
For comparison and to evaluate the impact of role models by type, results from the complete
specification of all treatment groups are also presented:
Ysi = + Ey k * TGk + 6Xsi + esi (1.25)
k
where TGk are indicators for whether school s belongs to treatment group k (k=1 to 7) as defined
in the design Table 1. Since treatment assignment was random, the errors esi are orthogonal to
treatment group dummies.
Motivated by the model's predictions, I also investigate the treatment effects by initial percep-
tion and by type (rich vs. poor). In particular, any schooling improvement due to the statistics
treatment should come from individuals whose initial perceived returns were below the estimated
average returns (I call this "underestimate"). I test this prediction by running the following
regression:
(Posttest - Pretest),i = a + yAnyStat, + ' 2AnyRM, + y3StatRM, + 5Pretest8 i(1.26)
+AjAnyStat, 1l(Under),i + A2AnyRM, * 1(Under)si (1.27)
+A3StatRM, * 1(Under),i + 0 * l(Under) + ei (1.28)
where 1(under) is a dummy equal 1 if at baseline, the individual perceived the returns to be lower
than the statistics provided. The coefficients of interest are A's on the interaction terms. A
positive A would imply stronger treatment effects on those who had underestimated the returns.
Moreover, we expect role model LH to increase the poor's schooling investment, but not the rich's.
I run a regression similar to equation 1.26, with all the seven treatment dummies interacted with
an indicator for (relatively) rich households. I will present these results in addition to the average
treatment effects.
1.5.3 Impact on Perceived Returns
1.5.3.1 Impact of Statistics on Perceived Returns
I first discuss the impact of the statistics intervention on endline perception, as summarized in
Table 6. The fraction of respondents not reporting perceived earnings decreased substantially
from the baseline to the endline survey. Only 15% of respondents in the comparison group failed
to report their perception (answering "Don't Know"), perhaps since the perception questions were
asked for the second time at the endline survey. The first column of Table 6 presents results for
the probability of not reporting earnings as the dependent variable in equations 1.22, 1.23, 1.24,
and 1.25. Since this "Don't Know" outcome is for each education level, these OLS regressions
stack up 4 education levels 1' and include education dummies in the regressions. I cannot reject
that the statistics treatment has zero impact on the likelihood of "Don't Know" perceived earnings.
These results are robust to controlling for baseline Don't Know status and robust to running probit.
Results are similar for Don't Know perceived earnings for average (not shown). While this finding
is surprising, it has the advantage that the results below are not biased by selective non-response.
The first-order question is whether people update perceived returns toward the statistics, as
predicted by the model. I find that providing statistics reduces the gaps between baseline perceived
returns and the estimated average returns that we saw in Figure 2B. Figure 3 and Figure 4 plot
the kernel densities of endline perceived returns in statistics schools and comparison schools. Eye-
balling these graphs, we see that the statistics schools' distribution tends to be more concentrated
around the vertical line of estimated average return. In addition, dispersion in the empirical
distribution of perceived returns also decreases. I reject the hypothesis that the variance of
perceived returns is the same in the comparison schools and statistics schools (p-value from the
variance ratio test is very close to zero). Table 6 confirms this conclusion by presenting estimates
of equations 1.22, 1.23, 1.24, and 1.25. The outcome variable in columns 2 and 3 is now the
absolute distance between endline perceived returns and the estimated average returns. Since the
perceived return outcome is for three levels of education, 12 these OLS regressions include education
dummies. Panel A shows that providing only statistics significantly decreases the gap by 0.149
from the control group average of 0.68. This reduction in the gap is similar for perceived returns
for self and for average. Note that combining statistics with role models undoes this effect: the
combined treatments have no impact on perceived returns. As a result, the average impact of any
11No primary education, only primary education, only lower secondary education, and only high school education.
12Primary education, lower secondary education, and high school.
statistics on the gap is not significant (Panel B). I will return to this point later when I discuss
role models.
Consistent with the theory, providing statistics leads individuals to update their perceived
returns for average rather than their relative position to the average. Column 4 of Table 6 shows
that the statistics treatment does not affect how far individuals think their returns are from their
perceived average. The coefficient estimate on AnyStatistics is close to zero and insignificant.
Given that people may have had imperfect information about the average returns, this evidence
suggests that they update their perceived returns for average toward the statistics and also update
their perceived returns for self by the same amount.
The above estimations on endline perceived returns potentially face a sample selection concern
since the "Don't Know" population is equivalent to missing data. However, the rate of "Don't
Know" is similar in the statistics schools and the comparison schools. People who did not report
perceived earnings have similar baseline characteristics across treatment groups, except for some
cases of slight income differences. Thus, selection is not likely to severely bias the impact of
statistics. In columns 5 and 6 of Table 6, I also restrict the sample to those who reported their
perceptions in both survey rounds and find similar results. The impact of statistics on perception
does not seem to be driven by the "Don't Know" population.
1.5.3.2 Impact of Role Models on Perceived Returns
Overall, the role model interventions have small effects on perception. The coefficients on role
models in columns 2 and 3 of Table 6 are close to zero and statistically insignificant. On average,
role models of any type decrease the gap between perceived return for self and the estimated average
return by 0.013, but this estimate is not statistically distinguishable from zero (Panel A). Panel D
reports the results for each type of role model. In the entire sample, none of the role model types
has a statistically significant impact on the gap in perceived returns.
The only type that may affect perception is role model LH. Recall that type LH is a role model
from the poor family background who has become very successful. When I control for baseline
perceived returns in the restricted name-matched sample, I find that role model LH combined with
statistics decreases the gap between perceived return for average and the estimated average return
by 0.13. Column 8 presents the treatment effects for the sample of poor families. Role model LH,
alone and when combined with statistics, decreases the gap for the poor. However, this effect is
not statistically different from the effect of role model HH.
Consistent with the theory, role models undermine the impact of statistics in general. Through-
out different samples of the regression in Panel A, the coefficient estimates on the combined treat-
ment are of similar magnitude but of the opposite sign as the coefficient on statistics. In column
2, for example, statistics alone decreases the gap by 0.149 while statistics and role model changes
the gap by -0.149 - 0.013 + 0.159 = -0.003, i.e. reverting the impact of statistics toward zero.
This finding suggests that households give less weight to the statistics in their updating when it is
accompanied by a role model since the role model signals high heterogeneity in the returns and,
therefore, low precision of the statistics.
1.5.4 Impact on Education Investment
1.5.4.1 Impact of Statistics on Education Investment
Given that at least some people update their perceived returns toward the statistics, we would
expect test scores and school attendance to also respond. In particular, providing statistics should
increase test scores for children with low initial perceived returns.
The statistics program's impact on test scores is consistent with these theoretical predictions.
Recall that these tests are achievement tests, and performance can be improved by exerting effort.
Since test scores are persistent, I control for each child's pretest score and report results from
equations 1.22, 1.23, 1.24, and 1.25 in column 2 of Table 7. The dependent variable is improvement
in normalized test scores. As shown in Panel A, the statistics (only) program increases test score
improvement by 0.20 standard deviations, conditional on what can be explained by the pretest. This
coefficient estimate is both statistically and economically significant. When we pool all statistics
schools together, test scores are on average 0.10 standard deviations higher than those in schools
without the statistics intervention. As a robustness check, the simple difference regression that
does not control for pretest score gives very similar coefficients, but less precisely estimated.
Individuals in our sample started with dispersed perceived returns, so we would expect the
treatment effects on test scores to be heterogenous. The theory predicts that schooling improve-
ment should come from individuals whose initial perceived returns were below the actual average
returns. For the subsample of test score data that can be name-matched to the baseline perceived
return data, column 6 presents the result from estimating equation 1.26. Consistent with the
theoretical prediction, the coefficient estimate of the statistics interaction term is positive and sta-
tistically significant. In particular, providing statistics increased test scores for those who initially
underestimated the returns by 0.365 standard deviations (column 4), while decreasing test scores
for those who overestimated the returns by 0.223 standard deviations (column 5). Since the error
terms are orthogonal to the treatment indicators, we can read these coefficients as the treatment
effects for those initially overestimating or underestimating the returns. A concern in interpreting
these results as Bayesian updating is that "underestimating" might be correlated with other fac-
tors affecting test scores. For example, everyone responded by increasing effort, but those who
overestimated the returns are somehow also those with negative productivity of effort.
The results on school attendance are also indicative of the impact of statistics. Column 1 of
Table 7 presents the results for school-level student attendance as the dependent variable in the
main estimating equations. Since these attendance rates are class averages rather than individual-
level data, observations are also weighted by class size. The regression outputs are for a random
sub-sample of 176 schools for which attendance data post-treatment is available. I find that pro-
viding solely statistics increases average attendance by 7.846 percentage points, though imprecisely
estimated due to the small sample size. Pooling all the statistics treatment together improves
power. As reported in Panel B under column 1, schools that received any statistics treatment
have on average 3.5 percentage points higher attendance rate in Grade 4, compared to the control
group mean of 85.6%. The results are robust to controlling for baseline school characteristics and
student attendance one school year before the treatment.
1.5.4.2 Impact of Role Models on Education Investment
Since role models have small effects on perception, their overall impact on schooling investment
is also small, as expected. The average test score is practically the same in the schools that
received any role model and those without role models (Panel C of Table 7). However, the role
model's background seems to matter, as discussed in section 1.5.3.2. As shown in Panel D, column
2 of Table 7, role model type LH increased test score significantly by 0.17 standard deviations.
Meanwhile, the estimated impact of role model HH is close to zero. I reject the null hypothesis
that role model type LH and type HH have equal coefficients (F-test p-value of 0.06).
The theory predicts that role model LH should have a positive influence on test scores for
students of poor family background. Column 9 reports estimation results from running a regression
similar to equation 1.26, with all the seven treatment dummies interacted with an indicator for rich
households. Role model LH increases average test score by 0.27 standard deviations for the poor,
but has practically little impact (statistically insignificant) on children from richer families. In
addition, I test for a difference-in-difference effect of role model LH vs. HH for the rich vs. poor.
However, with the large standard errors around the coefficient estimate for RM HH, I cannot reject
the difference between this coefficient and the coefficient on RM LH (the p-value is 0.34).
1.5.5 External Validity
Since all the comparison schools in my experiment organized a "placebo" school meeting, the
treatment effects I have measured may be safely attributed to the statistics or role model treatments
themselves. In addition, I have another group of "pure control" schools, which never came into
contact with the program nor with the perceived returns survey. The average test score in those
schools is very similar to that of the regular comparison schools. This evidence suggests that
simply participating in the experiment, i.e. organizing a meeting and being surveyed, does not
seem to have a significant impact on behaviors.
1.6 Conclusion
Information about the returns to education is essential to school decision making. In this paper,
I document that households in rural Madagascar have imperfect information about the returns
to education. I set up a field experiment to evaluate two approaches to alleviating imperfect
information: providing statistics on the returns to education, and sending a role model to the
school. Consistent with a model of belief formation, the results suggest that households update
their perceived returns after receiving the statistics and change schooling decisions accordingly.
The statistics intervention improved test scores by 0.37 standard deviations for those who had
initially "underestimated" the returns, and reduced test scores for those who had "overestimated"
the returns. As the theory predicts (and different from much of the policy discussion on role
models), role models have an ambiguous effect. They signal heterogeneity in the return, reducing
the impact of statistics toward zero. However, they increase schooling effort of those children
whose family background matches theirs.
Overall, the statistics program is a very cost-effective way to entice children to attend school and
improve test scores. Even though providing statistics decreased perceived returns to education
for some children and increased perceived returns for others, it led to an increase in schooling
on average. This program cost 0.08 USD per student but increased student attendance by 3.5
percentage points and improved test scores by 0.20 standard deviations after three months. This
implies a program cost of 2.30 USD for an additional year of schooling and 0.04 USD for additional
0.10 standard deviations in test scores, more cost-effective than previous interventions evaluated
in a randomized experiment (Jameel Poverty Action Lab 2005). Providing deworming drugs, to
date the most cost-effective way to increase attendance, costs 3.50 USD for an additional year of
schooling (Miguel and Kremer 2004). In terms of improving test scores, the extra-teacher balsakhi
program in India costs 0.67 USD per improvement of 0.10 standard deviations (Banerjee, Duflo,
Cole, and Linden 2007).
As a broader implication, my paper suggests that households respond to changes in perceived
returns when making schooling decisions. Thus, they would probably respond if the actual market
returns improved. As suggested in Foster and Rosenzweig (1996), market interventions to raise
the market returns to education may be very effective in increasing education.
There are several caveats and as yet unexplored issues that I plan to address in continuing
research. One main caveat is that the results presented here reveal only the short-run and direct
impacts. It will be useful to follow the students in my sample to see if their enrollment in later
school years increases because of the treatment, and if they will complete the primary cycle and go
on to secondary school after Grade 5. Collecting outcome data for other children in the same school
would also shed light on spillovers of information. Given the strong direct effects of statistics, it
is important to investigate in future research whether and how strongly such information spreads
to affect schooling decisions of other children in the same family, and of those in other families
through teachers or parents' social networks.
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Figure. 1: School District Map of Madagascar
Notes: The shaded areas are the 16 school districts in my study sample
Figure 2A: Baseline Beliefs of Job Types by Education
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Notes: "Primary Activities" include agriculture, cattle-raising, fishing, and forestry
activities. The survey questions on beliefs of job types ask respondents for the sector in
which they think their child could work at the age of 25, under different hypothetical
scenarios of educational attainment.
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Table 1: Experimental Design
Role Model Treatment
No RM Type LM Type LH Type HH
No Statistics TGO: 80 schools TG2: 80 schools TG3: 80 schools TG4: 80 schools
Statistics TG1: 80 schools TG5: 80 schools TG6: 80 schools TG7: 80 schools
Notes: "Any Statistics" Treatment refers to the second-row groups of schools. "Any
RM" refers to the last three columns. The combined treatment refers to groups 5, 6, and
7 where both the statistics and role model interventions took place. TGO denotes the
regular control group.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Obs
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: School Variables
Baseline Test Score 60.67 11.84 640
Enrollment 215.01 153.57 640
Repetition Rate 0.19 0.11 640
Number of Sections in School 5.51 2.03 640
Number of Classrooms in School 4.01 2.04 640
Panel B: Household Variables
Respondent Age 42.48 9.46 17158
Female Respondent 0.55 0.50 17158
Household Size (in persons) 6.60 2.11 17158
Respondent Literacy: Read and Write 0.88 0.33 17158
Respondent Literacy: Calculations 0.85 0.35 17158
Mother Primary Education 0.41 0.49 17158
Mother Secondary or Higher Education 0.01 0.10 17158
Father Primary Education 0.44 0.50 17158
Father Secondary or Higher Education 0.03 0.16 17158
Household Monthly Income (in Ar) 49703.97 90615.65 16754
Notes: 2000 Ar- 1 USD
Omitted Education category: No primary school
Table 3: Baseline Differences across Groups
Dependent variables
Fraction Not
Mother Has Father Has Household Reporting Perceived Perceived
Baseline Test Repetition Primary Primary Monthly Perceived Own Returns for Returns for
Score Enrollment Rate Education Education Income (in Ar) Earnings Self Average
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
TG1 = Statistics -0.509 -9.437 -0.017 -0.038 -0.028 9557.45 -0.019 -0.079 -0.204
(1.76) (22.28) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (10047.76) (0.08) (0.09) (0.065)**
TG2 = RM LM 0.03 44.375 0.012 -0.068 -0.063 855.201 0.075 -0.106 -0.155
(1.83) (24.40) (0.02) (0.032)* (0.03) (5122.38) (0.08) (0.09) (0.074)*
TG3 = RM LH 0.163 8.663 0.006 0.014 -0.003 823.111 -0.144 -0.12 -0.143
(1.78) (20.32) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (4468.32) (0.058)* (0.08) (0.069)*
TG4 = RM HH 0.268 13.613 0.02 -0.003 0.009 3967.85 0.068 0.073 0.029
(2.01) (28.50) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (4587.45) (0.07) (0.12) (0.13)
TG5 = Statistics+RM LM 0.076 7.738 -0.019 -0.062 -0.066 -2095.79 -0.01 -0.084 -0.086
(1.85) (21.63) (0.02) (0.03) (0.033)* (4332.30) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08)
TG6 = Statistics+RM LH -0.254 26.888 0.012 -0.009 -0.017 10435.82 -0.045 -0.013 -0.037
(1.95) (21.60) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (8248.42) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07)
TG7 = Statistics+RM HH 0.299 -9.687 0.02 -0.049 -0.051 295.55 -0.067 -0.1 -0.076
(2.11) (18.77) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (4736.78) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08)
Constant 60.66 204.74 0.19 0.43 0.47 46591.49 0.41 0.78 1.11
(1.365)** (14.429)** (0.014)** (0.024)** (0.023)** (3,592.01)** (0.054)** (0.068)** (0.061)**
Observations 640 640 640 17158 17158 16754 68632 31293 31306
F-stat (joint significance) 0.05 1.19 1.53 1.85 1.67 0.76 3.52 0.87 2.31
Notes: This table presents OLS results from regressing baseline school characteristics on different treatment group dummies.
Omitted category: control group.
Columns 1-3: school-level data, and robust standard errors in parentheses
Columns 4-6: individual-level data; Columns 7-9: individual data by education; standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the school level
Exchange rate: 2000 Ar- 1 USD
Omitted education category: No primary school
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 4: Attrition in Endline Data
Endline Perceived Returns Post-test
Baseline Characteristics across Schools of Differential Attrition Diff (Attriters - Stayers)
Mother Has Father Has Household Perceived Perceived
Percent Primary Primary Monthly Income Returns for Returns for Percent
Attrition Education Education (in 10000 Ar) Self Average Attrition Pretest Score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TG1 = Statistics 0.30 -0.097 -0.103 5.722 -0.338 -0.555 0.13 -0.182
(0.11) (0.15) (0.13) (4.35) (0.42) (0.277)* (0.02) (0.15)
TG2 = RM LM 0.19 -0.161 -0.182 3.364 -0.423 -0.387 0.14 0.037
(0.07) (0.12) (0.110)+ (2.82) (0.42) (0.31) (0.02) (0.13)
TG3 = RM LH 0.15 -0.221 -0.179 1.033 -0.439 -0.391 0.11 0.047
(0.07) (0.108)* (0.086)* (2.32) (0.35) (0.28) (0.01) (0.16)
TG4 = RM HH 0.10 -0.195 -0.257 -0.2 0.058 -0.475 0.12 0.038
(0.05) (0.14) (0.17) (3.04) (0.58) (0.46) (0.02) (0.16)
TG5 = Statistics+RM LM 0.01 -0.205 -0.197 0.315 -0.31 0.125 0.12 -0.057
(0.05) (0.105)+ (0.083)* (2.25) (0.34) (0.32) (0.02) (0.18)
TG6 = Statistics+RM LH 0.06 -0.014 -0.02 -5.272 -0.414 -0.624 0.10 -0.19
(0.03) (0.14) (0.12) (4.12) (0.56) (0.53) (0.01) (0.15)
TG7 = Statistics+RM HH 0.05 -0.442 -0.344 -2.663 0.004 -0.595 0.12 -0.13
(0.02) (0.204)* (0.174)* (2.66) (0.46) (0.42) (0.01) (0.17)
Control Group 0.09 0.13
(0.08) (0.02)
Observations 619 17029 17029 16627 31097 31125 13162
N•otes:
Attrition rates in endline perceived returns data are at the school level.
Column 1: school attrition rates are weighted by class size in the baseline data and sampling probability. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Columns 2-6 report the results from regressing each baseline characteristic on attrition rate interacted with treatment group dummies
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the school level. Omitted categories: Control group.
Attrition rates in posttest data are at the individual level. Column 8 reports the pretest score differences between attriters and stayers across groups
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 5: Perceived Earnings and Perceived Returns to Education at Baseline
Full sample Rich Poor
Perceived Perceived Perceived Perceived Perceived Perceived
(Self) (Average) (Self) (Average) (Self) (Average)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Fraction Not Reporting Perceived Earnings
No Primary 0.37 0.38 0.35 0.33 0.38 0.41
Primary 0.35 0.37 0.32 0.32 0.35 0.39
Lower Secondary 0.30 0.34 0.27 0.29 0.31 0.37
High School 0.28 0.34 0.24 0.29 0.30 0.37
Panel B: Median Perceived Returns
Primary 0.33 0.38 0.33 0.33 0.50 0.43
Lower Secondary 0.67 0.60 0.50 0.50 0.67 0.67
High School 0.67 0.67 0.63 0.65 0.67 0.67
Panel C: Standard Deviation of Perceived Returns
Primary 1.52 1.14 1.40 1.05 1.60 1.21
Lower Secondary 1.85 1.66 1.50 1.38 2.10 1.89
High School 1.80 1.63 1.55 1.52 1.98 1.73
Panel D: Mean and Standard Deviation of Perceived Monthly Earnings (in Ar.)
No Primary 46182 39117 53923 44325 38301 33509
(56452) (42582) (59614) (43248) (51002) (40611)
Primary 65352 55455 73311 62602 57506 47912
(77133) (62336) (78101) (65224) (75178) (57625)
Lower Secondary 109712 90920 117742 97972 101348 83185
(120973) (91504) (124307) (92108) (115293) (88921)
High School 197281 161548 207859 172628 185960 149695
(219231) (151763) (225197) (158897) (210685) (142717)
Panel E: Mean and Standard Deviation of Observed Monthly Earnings in Household Survey
No Primary 20699
(30649)
Primary 23812
(52465)
Lower Secondary 54025
(77611)
High School 100333
(157325)
Notes: Earnings measured in Ariary (Ar). Exchange rate: 2000 Ar- 1 USD
P'anel A
AnyStatistics
AnyRM
Statistics+RM
Panel B
AnyStatistics
Panel C
AnyRM
Panel D
TC1 = Statistics
TG2 = RM LM
TG3 = RM LH
TG4 = RM HH
TG5 = Statistics+RM LM
TG6 = Statistics+RM LH
TG7 = Statistics+RM HH
Constant
Observations
F-stat (TG3 + 6 = TG4 + 7)
Table 6: Impact on Endline Perceived Returns to Education
Dependent variables
Gap(#) (Entire sample) Gap (Matched sample)
Self - Difference
Not Report Self Average Average Self Average Rich Poor (Rich - Poor)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
0.054
(0.04)
0.089
(0.032)**
-0.074
(0.05)
-0.149
(0.081)+
-0.013
(0.07)
0.159
(0.096)+
-0.158
(0.085)+
-0.062
(0.07)
0.202
(0.097)*
-0.024
(0.05)
0.009
(0.04)
0.003
(0.06)
-0.003 -0.03 -0.007 -0.022
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03)
0.053 0.061 0.033 0.01
(0.025)* (0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
0.054
(0.04)
0.15
(0.047)**
0.04
(0.04)
0.059
(0.04)
0.041
(0.03)
0.055
(0.04)
0.124
(0.050)*
0.15
(0.026)**
61380
1.58
-0.149
(0.081)+
0.052
(0.09)
-0.034
(0.09)
-0.058
(0.09)
0.057
(0.08)
-0.089
(0.08)
0.054
(0.08)
0.68
(0.061)**
38262
0.92
-0.158
(0.085)+
-0.049
(0.08)
-0.054
(0.08)
-0.081
(0.09)
0.052
(0.09)
-0.106
(0.08)
0.029
(0.08)
0.60
(0.063)**
39007
0.94
-0.024
(0.05)
0.046
(0.05)
-0.02
(0.05)
-0.002
(0.05)
-0.015
(0.05)
-0.023
(0.05)
0.009
(0.05)
85.59
(4.687)**
35990
0.49
-0.23
(0.086)**
-0.011
(0.08)
0.237
(0.106) *
-0.21
(0.086)*
-0.068
(0.06)
0.228
(0.099) *
-0.053 -0.04
(0.06) (0.05)
0.106 0.043
(0.061)+ (0.06)
-0.23
(0.086)**
0.067
(0.10)
-0.07
(0.10)
-0.037
(0.10)
0.027
(0.09)
-0.084
(0.08)
0.077
(0.09)
0.68
(0.060)**
18487
1.80
-0.21
(0.086)*
-0.06
(0.08)
-0.079
(0.08)
-0.066
(0.08)
-0.043
(0.07)
-0.13
(0.072)+
0.051
(0.08)
0.61
(0.052)**
18774
2.53
-0.123
(0.11)
0.069
(0.09)
0.109
(0.14)
-0.374
(0.099)**
-0.128
(0.09)
0.409
(0.118)**
0.261
(0.126)*
0.202
(0.104)+
-0.313
(0.147)*
-0.051 -0.052 0.002
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
0.128 0.065
(0.075)+ (0.07)
-0.123
(0.11)
0.188
(0.13)
-0.015
(0.10)
0.032
(0.14)
0.043
(0.10)
-0.02
(0.09)
0.196
(0.12)
0.63
(0.068)**
9085
1.80
-0.374
(0.099)**
-0.089
(0.12)
-0.156
(0.13)
-0.144
(0.10)
-0.016
(0.10)
-0.179
(0.089) *
-0.071
(0.10)
0.78
(0.078)**
9261
0.65
0.061
(0.09)
0.261
(0.126)*
0.284
(0.138)*
0.147
(0.13)
0.177
(0.13)
0.063
(0.11)
0.159
(0.10)
0.269
(0.141)+
0.82
(0.074)**
18346
0.53
Notes: (#) Gap is the absolute distance ]Perceived Returns - Estimated Average Returnsl
Omitted categories: Control group. All regressions include dummies for education levels; coefficients not shown.
Standard errors clustered at the school level (621 schools); observations weighted by sampling probability
Columns 5-9: Sample matched to baseline perceived returns data; these regressions control for gap at baseline
Columns 7-9 present results for gap of perceived returns for self
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 7: Impact on Schooling Effort and Test Scores
Dependent variables
(Normalized) Posttest - Pretest (Matched Sample)
Difference
Under- Over- (Underestimated - Difference
Attendance Test Scores Test Scores estimated(#) estimated Overestimated) Rich Poor (Rich - Poor)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A
AnyStatistics 7.846 0.202 0.237 0.365 -0.223 0.576 0.249 0.264 -0.024
(4.87) (0.106)+ (0.111)* (0.156)* (0.17) (0.193)** (0.119)* (0.137)+ (0.13)
AnyRM 4.947 0.074 0.079 0.112 -0.203 0.32 0.087 0.101 -0.016
(5.00) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.12) (0.131)* (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
Statistics+RM -5.032 -0.132 -0.197 -0.384 0.273 -0.651 -0.217 -0.234 0.022
(5.36) (0.13) (0.13) (0.178)* (0.20) (0.229)** (0.15) (0.16) (0.16)
Panel B
AnyStatistics 3.517 0.105 0.091 0.079 -0.035 0.109 0.087 0.092 -0.01
(2.021)+ (0.057)+ (0.06) (0.08) (0.11) (0.12) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09)
Panel C
AnyRM 0.474 0.01 -0.014 -0.095 -0.105 0.016 -0.018 -0.01 -0.008
(2.11) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.11) (0.14) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Panel D
TG1 = Statistics 7.796 0.202 0.237 0.365 -0.223 0.576 0.247 0.264 -0.025
(4.93) (0.106)+ (0.111)* (0.157)* (0.17) (0.194)** (0.119)* (0.137)+ (0.13)
TG2 = RM LM 7.551 0.088 0.091 0.123 -0.231 0.353 0.164 0.055 0.105
(5.44) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.17) (0.158)* (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
TG3 = RM LH -0.771 0.17 0.156 0.15 -0.123 0.28 0.086 0.271 -0.182
(6.80) (0.096)+ (0.090)+ (0.10) (0.16) (0.157)+ (0.09) (0.112)* (0.104)+
TG4 = RM HH 5.646 -0.022 -0.002 0.045 -0.271 0.326 0.01 0.019 -0.014
(5.36) (0.10) (0.12) (0.14) (0.159)+ (0.176)+ (0.16) (0.11) (0.17)
TG5 = Statistics+RM LM 5.891 0.117 0.121 0.127 -0.106 0.226 0.009 0.233 -0.242
(5.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.15) (0.15) (0.126)+ (0.17)
TG6 = Statistics+RM LH 7.098 0.139 0.113 0.077 -0.201 0.282 0.184 0.037 0.15
(5.30) (0.11) (0.12) (0.17) (0.24) (0.27) (0.15) (0.12) (0.12)
TG7 = Statistics+RM HH 9.334 0.182 0.124 0.074 -0.139 0.218 0.138 0.129 0.004
(4.779)+ (0.106)+ (0.10) (0.11) (0.17) (0.17) (0.11) (0.13) (0.11)
Constant 85.59 -1.24 -1.17 -1.16 -0.93 -0.93 -1.15 -1.20 -1.19
(4.687)** (0.066)** (0.063)** (0.079)** (0.102)** (0.101)** (0.071)** (0.074)** (0.073)**
Observations 176 11659 6297 2877 492 3369 2911 3243 6154
Notes: (#) "Underestimated" denotes the subsample of individuals whose initial perceived returns were below the estimated average returns for some level of education
Omitted categories: Control group.
Column 1: school-level data, all attendance regressions control for school visit time.
Robust standard errors in parentheses; observations weighted by sampling probability and class size.
Columns 2-9: individual-level data. Standard errors clustered at the school level; observations weighted by sampling probability
Test score regressions all control for baseline pretest scores. Posttest scores are normalized by substracting the mean.
and divided by the standard deviation of the control group pretest.
Columns 3-9: Sample matched to baseline perceived returns data.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Appendix Figure 1: Extensive-Form Representation of the Game
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Appendix Figure 2: Information Card
Ministry of Education RETURNS TO EDUCATION IN MADAGASCAR 2005
This table presents the average monthly income (in ARIARY) of 25
year-old Malagasies, by gender and by different educational levels.
Without any degree
34 524 Ar
47 637 Ar
Primary school
with CEPE
44 119 Ar
60 877 Ar
Source :Calculations from the 2005 Household Survey
Lower secondary
school with BEPC
73 771 Ar
101 793 Ar
At least high school
with BAC
163 344 Ar
225 389 Ar
Notes: The columns represent education levels (CEPE, BEPC, and BAC are the
corresponding degrees); the rows give the mean earnings from household survey. 1 USD
= 2000 Ar. The gain from education is illustrated by increased numbers of rice bags.
Female
Male
Gain
~- -I I- M
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Chapter 2
Improving Management in Education: Evidence from a
Randomized Experiment in Madagascar
2.1 Introduction
Inadequate quality in education is a concern in many developing countries, despite increased funding
and inputs that go into the system. In Madagascar, recent reforms since 2002 to provide free primary
education as well as free inputs (school kits and basic textbooks) are still insufficient to ensure a
basic education. Only 63% of Grade 5 children pass the primary-cycle exam, a minimum level
of language and math knowledge presumed at this grade (Tan 2005). The political economy of
public good provision argues that government bureaucrats might have better incentives to improve
quantity, rather than quality, of services since the benefits of improving service quality are diffuse
and harder to verify (Glewwe and Kremer 2005). The World Development Report 2004 thus points
to the need of promoting local accountability, that is, enabling the beneficiaries of education to
take control of service quality (World Bank 2004).
It remains an open empirical question which interventions, solely top-down approaches or with
beneficiary participation, actually improve public services. A top-down approach could aid bu-
reaucrats in their work to monitor school quality. Its impact is based on the premise that these
administrators have the right incentives and would carry out effective monitoring. While Olken
(2007) shows that external auditors were successful in monitoring corruption and ensuring quality
in Indonesian road projects, we cannot say anything definitive about relying on the existing man-
agement system to do the same. On the other hand, promoting local accountability may work well
if we know exactly what makes beneficiary participation effective. Beneficiary participation takes
several forms: parents can monitor teachers either directly via a punishment and reward scheme or
indirectly by complaining to the district supervisors. However, participatory programs that require
joint actions by a group of parents may face coordination failures and free-riding problems.
To contribute to this debate, we present in this paper evidence from a large-scale random-
ized experiment in Madagascar's public primary school system. We study the impact of top-down
interventions within the existing education system, alone versus in combination with local account-
ability. The goal of the interventions evaluated here (called AGEMAD 1 program) was to facilitate
the administrators' tasks in supervising their schools, on one level. On another level, the motivation
was also to provide the village community with information about their school's performance and
to allow them to coordinate on taking actions directly. A presumption behind AGEMAD is that
lack of information and complementary inputs hold back effective control by the beneficiaries and
quality service delivery by the education workers.
Our strategy involves three interventions implemented by the Ministry of Education. The first
intervention provided the district administrators with operational tools for their tasks and a training
on those tools. The second intervention did this, and in addition, trained and provided respective
tools to the subdistrict head. Some examples of the administrators' tools are supervision forms for
school visits and information on the performance and resource level at each of their schools. These
operational tools are designed to help administrators better supervise the quality of education
delivered at the school and allocate resources efficiently within their jurisdiction.
The third intervention had an additional treatment at some randomly selected schools to involve
the parents in monitoring school activities. This school-level intervention entailed school meetings
organized by the AGEMAD team to provide the parents with the school report card and allowed
them to coordinate on doing something about education at the village. Even when the beneficiaries
can exercise control and teachers exert more efforts, they may still lack the complementary inputs
to improve teaching quality. AGEMAD therefore provided pedagogical and administrative tools
1 AGEMAD is the French acronym for improving management in education in Madagascar.
for teachers. Examples of such complementary inputs are structured tools for lesson planning,
records of student attendance and learning, and reports to parents and to the school director.2
The other untreated schools in treated districts and treated subdistricts benefited from the top-
down interventions but did not receive the report cards and teacher tools directly. It was the
responsibility of the district and subdistrict heads to distribute them and implement a monitoring
system in those schools.
We collected data on a variety of teaching practices through a school survey. We also collected
student attendance data during unannounced visits and student test scores from an achievement test
administered independently. We find that the interventions targeted at the district and subdistrict
administrators have minimal effects on their behaviors and on the schools and students under
their responsibility. This is not because the tools failed entirely: each tool is used by 90% of the
subdistrict heads and more than half of the district heads on average. While treated subdistrict
heads visited their schools more often, they did not actively involve the parents and the local
community in monitoring the school. The teachers in these two treatment groups do not plan
their lessons or evaluate their students more, and the students perform no better than those in the
comparison group.
On the contrary, the third intervention, implemented at the school level, led to an improvement
in several teaching behaviors and student outcomes. Teachers' lesson planning practices improved
by 0.26 standard deviations on average, and student evaluation practices by 0.14 standard de-
viations. Meanwhile, teacher attendance and the school's communication with parents did not
improve. This result is consistent with the predictions of a multi-tasking principal-agent model in
which teacher efforts are directed toward activities closely tied with observable indicators of their
performance, such as those in the book records. The net effect on student attendance was positive:
2Evidence to date (Glewwe et. al (2002), Glewwe et. al (2004), and Banerjee et. al (2002)) shows that more
resources alone, such as textbooks, flip charts, additional teachers, do not lead to improved learning at the school.
Our conjecture is that resources directly aimed at changing the way education is delivered, such as the AGEMAD
tools, can work.
4.3 percentage point increase from 87% mean attendance. Test scores of students in this treatment
group are 0.1 standard deviations higher than those in the comparison group, as well as those
affected by the interventions at higher levels, two years after the implementation of the program.
We interpret these results as suggesting that in the Madagascar context, it is difficult to rely
on the existing hierarchy to implement effective monitoring. In the literature evaluating top-down
programs, the results presented here differ from Olken (2007). He finds that top-down monitoring
reduces corruption by more than the grassroots programs in his experiments. While monitoring
in that case was carried out by an external audit agency, the evidence from Madagascar indicates
that targeting bureaucrats within the system did not lead to more successful monitoring, especially
when our top-down interventions did not introduce explicit incentives for the bureaucrats to do so.
In this way, our paper resonates earlier evidence that local government bureaucrats by themselves
do not succeed in implementing incentive programs in service delivery (Kremer and Chen (2002),
Banerjee, Duflo, and Glennerster (2008)).
The grassroots approach with beneficiary control worked better than the top-down approach
in our context. Comparing the results here with the literature, we argue that it was important to
arrive at a specific action plan in designing this participatory program. The existing set of field
experiments to evaluate the impact of accountability in developing countries gives mixed evidence.
Some participatory programs do not work while others do, with specific steps for the beneficiaries
to take actions. Kremer and Vermeersch (2005) does not find any improvement in test scores
or teacher attendance when parent associations in Kenya are allowed to choose and implement a
reward program for teachers. Banerjee et. al. (2008) finds no effect of participatory programs in
India, which organized a village meeting to inform the village community about the poor status of
learning there and about the control power of the village education committee. The school-level
intervention in Madagascar is quite similar to this information project in India with respect to the
parent meeting and the school report card components. One difference is that AGEMAD suggested
in the school meeting's agenda what the parents can do, aside from the contextual distinction. The
AGEMAD meetings all yielded in an action plan with specific goals and tasks for the school, as
well as the actors in charge of doing and monitoring each task. This activity at least ensures no
coordination failure at the early stage for the large group of parents to agree on what to do. In this
sense, our results are similar to Bjorkman and Svensson (2006), which finds that accountability
improves health services in Uganda. The community meetings there to discuss the status of public
health services were structured to lead to an action plan. Duflo et. al (2007) also finds support for
the use of parental supervision in monitoring teacher practices and improving children's learning.
They study an intervention in Kenya that empowered school committees in randomly selected
schools with training in how to monitor teachers, and with a formal committee meeting to evaluate
teachers' performance. They find that teachers in those schools attend class and teach more often,
and their students have higher test scores than those in the schools without empowered parental
involvement. In both of these latter studies as well as ours, the parents had specific steps toward
to taking actions.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2.2 provides a sketch of the institutional
context in Madagascar. Section 2.3 describes the package of interventions and the evaluation
design. In section 2.4, we discuss data collection and experimental validity. Section 2.5 presents
the empirical strategy and results of the experiment. The final section concludes.
2.2 Primary Education System in Madagascar
On the supply side, the administrative structure of education in Madagascar is a typical hierarchy
from the Ministry of Education (MENRS) to districts, subdistricts, and schools. Overall, roughly
2.7 million students are enrolled in 15,000 public primary schools. These schools are grouped
into subdistrict zones called ZAPs whereby the ZAP head provides frontline administrative and
pedagogical support. These officers report to one of 111 school district (CISCO) heads, who in
turn report to MENRS. The CISCO and ZAP heads manage resource flows to schools, oversee
teaching and learning practices as well as the collection of school statistics. They also administer
the annual national examination at the end of Grade 5 (CEPE exam). Some specific examples of
their work include visiting schools for supervision, disbursing teacher paychecks, processing their
in-service training and transfer requests, organizing school building and maintenance projects, and
distributing books and school grants. The selection of CISCO heads is now nominally competitive,
with performance-based reviews after each three-year contract. ZAP heads are usually retired
teachers; they rarely face any firing threat.
On the beneficiary side, the main channel of community involvement in primary education in
Madagascar has been mostly informal through local parents' associations (FRAM). Recognizing
the informal existence of the FRAMs, the government of Madagascar created formal school boards
(FAF) starting in 2002-2003. These committees are responsible exclusively for managing capitation
grants and not focused on education quality. School boards consist of the village head, the school
director, the subdistrict head (rarely there), teacher representatives and the president of FRAM.
Together, the FRAM and the school board could exercise control power to pressure the teachers to
deliver quality services.
In theory, FRAMs have both direct (social pressure, hire and fire contract teachers3 ) and indirect
control (report school problems or complain to higher authorities). In practice, each FRAM is
usually a small group consisted of a few nominated parents. First, to influence the school may
require joint actions from all the parents rather than just this small group. Coordination failures and
freeriding problems may lead to limited participatory actions from the existing FRAMs. Second,
they seem to know little about how children at the school are doing, and thus not doing enough to
influence the school's operations. Given the possible lack of knowledge of the villagers about the
school's performance, providing them with school report cards and organizing local accountability
meetings to help parents coordinate on doing something about education might in turn improve
3 These contract teachers usually hold only a lower secondary or high school degree, hired directly by FRAM and
paid on average half the salary of the regular teachers.
incentives for school teachers.
But even if the community puts pressure on the teachers or complains to district and subdistrict
heads, these actors themselves do not always have the proper means to actually do their work better.
Our observations from the field suggest that teachers do not dispose of basic and standardized tools
for their routine tasks to ensure a quality education. Higher-level administrators do not have the
right information and tools to monitor, allocate resources, and provide support optimally across
the schools under them. It is then possible to improve the quality of education by providing actors
at all administrative levels with operational tools to improve their productivity.
2.3 The AGEMAD Interventions
2.3.1 Description and Structure of the Program
The AGEMAD program evaluated in this study was implemented by the Madagascar Ministry of
Education (MENRS), with support from the World Bank and the French Development Agency. It
is one of MENRS's strategic policies to develop efficient management within the primary education
system, with the first 2 school years from September 2005 to June 20074 as a pilot study for
evaluation. We will refer to 2005-6 as "year 1" and 2006-7 as "year 2."
In 2005, MENRS initiated its AGEMAD program in 3774 public primary schools of 30 rural
CISCOs. This purposive sample represents all geographical areas of the country, but focuses on
those CISCOs with relatively high repetition rates. For the purpose of the experiment, we excluded
schools that are too far away and extremely difficult to access.
As we investigate whether top-down interventions work to improve public services or beneficiary
monitoring is also necessary, the AGEMAD initiative took place at three levels in the administrative
system: CISCO, ZAP, and school. To give an overview, the CISCO and ZAP interventions provided
operational tools for administrators to monitor and support their schools. Meanwhile, the school-
4The school year in Madagascar runs from September to June.
level intervention has a "bottom-up" component on top of these treatments, giving parents a way
to act directly. First, 15 CISCOs were randomly chosen to receive the CISCO-level treatment;
no contact was made in the remaining 15 control CISCOs. The CISCO team received a training
and sufficient operational tools to facilitate their routine tasks during the school year. Tools for
CISCO heads include forms for supervision visits to the school or procurement sheets for school
supplies and school grants. See Appendix Table 4 for the full list of CISCO tools. These are printed
templates for the users to fill in according to the attached instructions. One exception is the CISCO
report card that each treated CISCO received, which actually has information on the performance
(dropout rate, CEPE exam pass rate, and repetition rate) and resource level of all the ZAPs under
this CISCO. The CISCO head can find this tool useful in evaluating and monitoring subdistricts.
Second, some ZAPs were selected randomly within treated CISCOs to receive the ZAP-level
intervention, which is quite similar to that at the CISCO but with ZAP tools and ZAP report
cards. Examples of tools for ZAP heads include forms for supervision visits to the school, community
meeting forms, or procurement sheets for school supplies and school grants. The full list is displayed
in Appendix Table 3. The ZAP report card has information on the performance and resource level
of all the schools under this ZAP. The CISCO and ZAP interventions are two levels of "top-down"
programs to facilitate administrators' work in monitoring schools under their jurisdiction. Tool
distribution was accompanied by user trainings in September of each year. During training sessions,
MENRS representatives emphasized on the core responsibilities of each actor, and explained how
to use the tools in performing these responsibilities.
Third, within treated ZAPs, some schools were randomly chosen to receive the school treatment,
in addition to the interventions at higher administration. The school-level intervention aimed to
improve accountability by sharing information and mobilizing parents to coordinate on an action
plan. In particular, MENRS distributed directly to the treated schools their school report card
with performance indicators from the previous academic year, and organized accountability meet-
ings for the parents to discuss it. The three simple indicators presented on the report card should
be comprehensible to illiterate parents: dropout rate, CEPE exam pass rate, and repetition rate.
All statistics were calculated using data from the national school census. Based on these statis-
tics, MENRS classified schools into four categories of performance relative to resource endowment
(resource is proxied by the student-teacher ratio). "Exceptional" represents schools with relatively
few resources but perform well in terms of dropout rate, CEPE pass rate, or repetition rate. "Sat-
isfactory" implies schools with good resources and good performance. "Difficulty" means having
few resources and performing poorly. "Disappointing" schools are those with good resources but
performing poorly. A school may be satisfactory in terms of exam pass rate but disappointing in
terms of repetition rate. An example of the school report card (translated from the original version
in French and Malagasy) is included in Appendix Figure 1.
To help parents focus attention and action on results as shown in the report card, AGEMAD
also organized two accountability meetings between the treated school and the parents as well as
the local community. One took place at the beginning and the other near the end of the school year.
MENRS suggested an agenda for these half-day school meetings and requested that an action plan
was set up at the first meeting of the year and evaluated at the last meeting, but the actual content
of discussion was not mandated and left to the discretion of the participants. 5 Proposed items on
the agenda include a review of the current situation at the school, its progress with information
available from the report card, discussion on possible solutions to existing problems, and setting
goals in an actual action plan. To arrive at a specific plan, the participants first identified the issues
hampering academic achievements and then prioritized the activities to overcome these problems.
The action plan had to be approved by the general audience at the parent meeting. While the level
of details varies from school to school, it typically has a list of objectives or desired improvement
in certain general activities such as teaching. For each objective, several tasks were identified to be
5MENRS did not send any of its staff to the school meetings. About half of the times, the ZAP head is present, but
that is part of his/her job and not really the presence of a new authority figure. MENRS had also hired facilitators
to ensure that school meetings indeed took place and to collect information on the meetings. One facilitator would
attend each meeting, but would usually not intervene.
performed over a specified time period, along with the actors responsible for them. One example
of the goals is to increase the exam pass rate at the school by 5 percentage points by the end of the
academic year. The common tasks specified for the teachers include lesson planning and student
evaluation every few weeks. Each parent and the parent association are expected to monitor the
student evaluation reports that the teachers are supposed to communicate to them.
These treated schools also received director and teacher tools directly. Teacher tools are, for
example, lesson-planning notebooks, class attendance registers, and grade registers. The director
would have the registration roster, summary of student test scores, and community meeting forms.
Appendix Tables 1-2 list all these tools, designed to be user-friendly and time-efficient. They were
produced as physical sheets of paper or notebooks, for the users to fill in throughout the school
year. The presumed benefit of the tools is to provide inputs complementary to education workers'
effort in their work, in turn improving school quality.
The other schools in the treated ZAPs and 15 treated CISCOs did not receive any direct school-
level intervention. Report cards and sample teacher tools were created for them, but it was left
to the hands of the CISCO and ZAP heads to distribute, implement the tools, and monitor school
activities. There was no option to have a treatment group with school report cards alone since it
would have been practically difficult to work with government schools in Madagascar without going
through the district and subdistrict heads.
The treatment design with the relevant samples of observations is demonstrated in Table 1.
Treatment assignment was random, stratified by baseline repetition rate and school size (and geo-
graphical region for the CISCO randomization). The above levels of treatment intensity generate
four types of schools. The control group includes all the schools in the 15 control CISCOs. The first
treatment group refers to those schools influenced by the program only at their CISCO (schools in
AGEMAD CISCOs). The second group of treated schools is influenced by interventions at both
the CISCO and ZAP levels (schools in AGEMAD ZAPs). These two treatment groups represent
a top-down approach to improving school quality. It is the responsibility of the CISCO and ZAP
administrators to monitor the schools. The third type of treatment schools (called AGEMAD
schools) received all three levels of interventions, CISCO/ZAP/school. The additional bottom-up
component here engaged parents into acting directly rather than depending on the bureaucrats.
Due to budget constraints, we randomly selected 303 schools in each of the four groups, i.e. 1212
schools total, as the follow-up sample for data collection. 6
This design allows us to learn which approach in the AGEMAD interventions effectively improve
the way schools function and student performance. The top-down approach may work if the CISCO-
level and ZAP-level interventions produced sufficient impact on service provider behaviors and on
key schooling outcomes. On the other hand, such interventions might be ineffective unless reinforced
by direct involvement of the parents through accountability meetings at the school.
Our tracking data suggests that the interventions were well implemented with good take-up. All
the AGEMAD schools that were intended actually received the tools and organized the meetings.
Accountability meetings were well attended with 64 participants on average, half of whom were
women. 30% of the attendees spoke up and asked questions at least once. 94% of these account-
ability meetings discussed the school report cards and students' learning results as intended. On
average, 85% of the teachers in AGEMAD schools reported using several tools, with the pedagogical
and evaluation tools used by almost everyone. Tool usage rate is lower for the director (65%). Of
those who used the tools, close to 100% found them useful.
2.3.2 Why Might We Expect These Interventions to Work?
Teacher effort is an important input in students' learning, so higher teacher effort would improve
the quality of education at school. In theory, we would expect that most means of monitoring could
potentially give teachers better incentives to perform their duty, thus leading to higher test score
achievement for students.
6 Power calculations showed that this sample size is sufficient to detect an increase of 0.25 standard deviations
in school-level average test scores with 95% confidence. Since we could later collect individual-level test scores, this
sample of schools should allow us to detect a smaller treatment effect.
The top-down interventions need not always produce an impact. If the CISCO and ZAP admin-
istrators in treated districts actually monitor school activities, well-audited schools may perform
better. The question is whether we can rely on the existing hierarchy to carry out effective mon-
itoring. These interventions were implemented within the current institutions, almost entirely by
the Ministry rather than a substitute system of management. The ZAP and CISCO heads do not
face direct reward and punishment mechanisms for monitoring their schools well. It is ambiguous if
the ZAP and CISCO interventions bring about strong changes in behaviors and student outcomes.
Alternatively, the school intervention provides information on school performance and allows the
parents to coordinate on taking actions to monitor service quality. School report cards were rare in
rural Madagascar, and centrally-generated report cards were non-existent before the program. This
component of AGEMAD therefore provided probably new information on the quality of current
services. With that, parents can exercise social pressure on the teachers or implement explicit
incentive schemes so that the school does a better job of teaching. The school-level treatment is
expected to affect teacher behaviors if the parents register the information provided on the report
card, believe that they can exercise their control power, and successfully coordinate. This is likely
the case in our intervention. Most parents attended the school meetings and participated actively
in the discussion of the report card and of an action plan.
2.4 Evaluation
2.4.1 Data Collection
We expect the interventions to affect intermediate outcomes such as behaviors of education workers
and the functioning of the school. This data comes mainly from the school questionnaire in 1212
schools of the follow-up sample. During each of the two school years between January and May,
MENRS hired an NGO (Aide et Action) to administer a school questionnaire during randomly
timed, unannounced visits to the schools in the follow-up sample. In addition to spot-checking
teacher and student absenteeism, the surveyor interviewed the school director and teachers about
their usage of common tools and their administrative and pedagogical practices. For example,
some self-reported measures include: pedagogical organization, student assessment and attendance
registration, and communication with the parents and local school community. The year 1 ques-
tionnaire took place right after the interventions while teachers were just familiarizing themselves
with the tools. Since we have better data in year 2, we will report the results from this latter school
questionnaire.
In year 2, we also surveyed the ZAP heads on their interactions with their schools. In particular,
we will see if treated ZAP heads pay more visits and attend more meetings at schools in difficulty
as notified in the report card.
The next outcome of interest, student attendance, was collected by surveyors during unan-
nounced school visits. From this data, we constructed three measures of attendance rates. First,
"classroom count" is the ratio of student attendance in each classroom to its enrollment. This num-
ber is reported during individual teacher interviews with the surveyor. Second, "surveyor reported"
is the ratio of how many students in the whole school the surveyor can quickly see upon arrival,
divided by the enrollment of classes in session. This data is not the most precise since the surveyor
did not have enough time to do a headcount, so he or she would give a rough guess instead. Third,
"director's book record" is attendance rate from the school director's official record. Dropout and
repetition rates are also available in the year-end statistical form (Fiche de Fin d'Annre) adminis-
tered nationally by MENRS.
We are interested in whether and what levels of interventions ultimately improve learning.
Our primary data on learning comes from achievement test scores collected in both years of the
experiment. MENRS administered the year 1 test to Grade 3 students in February 2006 (close to
baseline). The endline test was administered to the same children in May 2007 (then in Grade 4).
The testing instrument was based on PASEC tests7 and already well-developed with effective testing
7PASEC (Programme d'Analyse des Systimes Educatifs de la CONFEMEN) is a program in 15 francophone
procedures. These two tests are intended to measure children's competency in three materials:
math, French, and Malagasy. They include basic calculations and grammar questions at the level
that Grade 3 and Grade 4 students, respectively, are supposed to master. We normalize the endline
test scores by subtracting the mean, then dividing by the standard deviation of the control group.
Moreover, the national school census serves as a secondary source of learning data. CEPE
(end-of-primary-cycle national examination) exam results for Grade 5 students are available at the
school level.
2.4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for a range of school characteristics prior to the interventions,
and also confirms that the treatment and control groups do not differ systematically, as expected
given the random assignment. The average school has more than 200 students, with roughly
54 students per teacher. 66% of Grade 5 students in these schools pass the minimum learning
requirement, the CEPE exam. 18% of students repeat a grade, and 6% of students enrolled at the
beginning of the school year drop out by the end. Columns 2-4 show that the treatment groups are
statistically similar to the comparison group in terms of these characteristics.
2.4.3 Attrition
To minimize the potential bias caused by differential attrition, we tried to measure outcome vari-
ables for all the original participants of the program. The endline test was administered to as many
of the baseline children as possible. The school director had asked children who no longer attended
school to come at the day of the test; home visits were made to a random subset of the attriters.
Table 3 shows attrition rates by treatment assignment. The first row suggests that attrition is
roughly 13% and is similar across treatment status. A further check is on the type of children who
have attrited from our sample. If we look at their baseline test scores and their gender, differences
countries that studies elements of learning for students.
between the attriters and stayers are small and again similar in our treatment and control groups.
2.5 Estimation Strategy and Results
We first discuss the interventions' impact on intermediate outcomes such as teacher behaviors,
director behaviors and general functioning of the school, as well as behaviors of the ZAP and CISCO
heads. Then we report treatment effects on student attendance, dropout rate, and learning.
The main estimating equation used throughout this analysis is
Yi = a +0,1 * TG1, + 0 2 * TG2, + 03 * TG3, + MXis + eis (2.1)
where Yi, represents outcome variables, on behaviors and on students' performance, of individual
i in school s. TG's denote treatment group indicators, with the control group being the omitted
category. TG1 is an indicator for whether the school is in a treated CISCO. TG2 is an indicator for
whether the school is in a treated ZAP. TG3 is an indicator for whether the school itself received the
AGEMAD interventions. Given the randomization, our coefficients of interest P's are interpretable
as the causal impact of different levels of the AGEMAD treatment. We control for various baseline
school or individual characteristics X. All the regressions using the school questionnaire data
control for the month of random school visits to account for seasonal variation.
We also run an alternative regression with a dummy for any treatment at all (1, 2, or 3) in
addition to the treatment 3 dummy. We can interpret / as the effect of Treatments 1 or 2 versus
the control group, and $4 as the effect of Treatment 3 versus Treatments 1 or 2.
yi, = a + p * AnyTreatment, + /4 * TG3s + 6Xij + aes (2.2)
Both equations are estimated using OLS, with standard errors clustered at the CISCO level
since treatments were implemented at this level.8 Observations are weighted by the probability of
selection.
Since there are many intermediate outcomes on behaviors that may have been affected by AGE-
MAD, we adopt the approach from Katz, Kling, and Liebman (2007) when appropriate. We group
outcomes into categories of related variables and report the average effect of each category: lesson
planning, student evaluation practices, communication and meetings to discuss student matters,
and so on. For example, the average standardized effect of Treatment 3 for a category of K out-
comes, each indexed by k, is defined as 03 = .j =l where $3k is the coefficient from equation
(2.1) for outcome k, and ak is the standard deviation of this outcome. We calculate the standard
errors of this average effect by estimating a system of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) for
the outcomes in each category.
2.5.1 Intermediate Outcomes at School
2.5.1.1 Impact of CISCO and ZAP Interventions on Intermediate Outcomes
The first set of intermediate outcomes at the school is teacher behaviors, as measured in the school
survey. Table 4 reports treatment effects on teacher attendance and pedagogical practices. The
first set of Regression (1) reports OLS results of equation (2.1) for various outcome variables of
teacher behaviors, listed on the leftmost column. The second set of Regression (2) runs equation
(2.2) and gives quite similar results with more precise estimates. These results are robust to a
varying set of teacher and school control variables.
We find that schools benefiting from the CISCO and ZAP interventions do not generally have
better teacher practices. The SUR analysis for lesson planning is presented in Panel B. Columns 3,
4, and 6 show no significant improvement in the schools that received the district and subdistrict
interventions. Teachers of these schools (treatment groups 1 and 2) are on average 0.1 standard
8 A probit estimation instead of the linear probability version of equations (2.1) and (2.2) provides very similar
results. The estimates are also similar if we restrict the sample to treatment groups 2 and 3 and cluster the standard
errors at the school level.
deviations more likely to perform these tasks, but the estimate is statistically indistinguishable
from zero. Similarly in terms of student evaluation practices, column 6 in Panel C suggests that
schools in the treated districts and sub-districts do not perform these tasks better than the control
schools. We will return to this point when we discuss the ZAP's behaviors.
As shown in Panel A of Table 4, the CISCO and ZAP interventions do not improve teacher
attendance. We study three measures of teacher attendance. That reported by the director during
the random check is attendance at the teacher level, while the other two measures are at the
school level. The third measure, percentage of teachers present reported by the surveyor during
his random visit, comes from an approximate headcount upon arrival and is relatively noisy. The
mean attendance rate in column 1 suggests less than 10% absenteeism, in contrast to higher teacher
absenteeism in Kenya-20% (Glewwe et. al. 2003) or India-25% (Chaudhury et. al. 2006). The
coefficient estimates of treatment effects for treatments 1 and 2 are often negative in columns 3, 4,
and 6, though very small and hardly distinguishable from zero.
The second set of intermediate outcomes at the school is the director's behaviors and school
functioning. We collected some observational data at the outset of each unannounced school visit
to measure general school functioning, but find no sign of significant improvement in those schools
receiving the top-down interventions. According to Panels A and B of Table 5, there is no strong
difference between treatment 1 or 2 and the control schools concerning whether students are playing
in the hall during class time, whether the teachers are teaching, and the chance that a classroom
has a teacher or a lesson in progress. The results on control and reporting practices by the director
are displayed in Panel C. Our estimation of regression (2) implies zero average treatment effect
for schools in the district and subdistrict interventions versus the control group. The estimate of
-0.04 standard deviations is statistically insignificant. Together, one interpretation of these no-
impact findings for the top-down interventions is that the treated CISCO and ZAP heads do not
by themselves implement more effective monitoring.
2.5.1.2 Impact of School Intervention on Intermediate Outcomes
In contrast to the above results on the CISCO and ZAP interventions, the additional school-level
intervention appears to be effective in monitoring some school activities. As displayed in Table
4, teachers' practices are improved in AGEMAD schools along some dimensions. Lesson planning
is performed much more frequently in AGEMAD schools than in all the others (Panel B, column
2). From a SUR analysis, we find that teachers of AGEMAD reinforced schools (treatment group
3) are on average 0.26 standard deviations more likely to perform these tasks. This estimate is
statistically significant at the 5% level. Student evaluation (Panel C) has improved on average by
0.14 standard deviations in AGEMAD schools compared to control schools. This estimate has large
standard errors, and is statistically significant only in regression (2). As implied in column 5, while
schools in treated districts and sub-districts do not improve student evaluation practices, schools
treated directly with the parents' involvement fare better by 0.07 standard deviations. These results
suggest that allowing the beneficiaries to coordinate on exercising their control power to improve
education leads to better teaching quality in this context.
However, teacher attendance does not improve in AGEMAD schools even though the director
says that (s)he records teacher absences more frequently. The coefficient estimates on treatment 3
in Panel A of Table 4 are often negative, though very small and hardly distinguishable from zero.
It may be costly for the parents to verify teacher presence. Then as long as the school director
states in the official school records that teachers still show up regularly, there is no additional
incentive induced by AGEMAD for teachers to come to school more regularly. Contract teachers
are associated with lower presence rate than regular teachers, but the treatments do not affect their
attendance differentially.
While teachers say they talk to the director often, only about half of them communicated
with some parents over the previous month. Teachers in treated schools are no more likely to
communicate with the parents or with the director on student matters, as presented in Panel D of
Table 4. Overall, we do see that teacher behaviors improve on dimensions that are easily recorded
for future evaluation of their work (filling out lesson planning and giving exams) and do not improve
on other dimensions (teacher attendance and communication with the parents and the director).
This finding is consistent with a multi-tasking principal-agent model in which teacher efforts are
directed toward activities closely tied with observable evaluation indicators of their performance.
Table 5 presents the impact results of the additional school-level intervention on director be-
haviors and school functioning. While the standard errors in regression (1) are large, we find in
regression (2) an average treatment effect of 0.07 standard deviations better control and reporting
practices by the director in AGEMAD schools versus those in the district and subdistrict inter-
ventions. This average effect estimate, reported in Panel C column 5, is statistically significant at
the 10% level. In particular, the director claims he is 8.5 percentage points more likely to record
teacher absenteeism in treated schools (column 2, significant at the 1% level). Nonetheless, as we
have discussed, teacher attendance does not improve. Self-reported monitoring from the director
is either inaccurate or does not appear effective.
Similar to our findings for the teachers, there is no significant improvement in terms of the
director's communication with teachers and with the community on school matters. While the
estimates in Panel D are not small (average effects around 0.08 standard deviations), they are
imprecise. According to Panels A and B of Table 5, we do not find significant improvement
in general school functioning in AGEMAD schools. In sum, the school-level intervention affects
mainly the teaching activities at school and the director's monitoring practices.
2.5.2 Behaviors of ZAP and CISCO Heads
To better understand the contrast between the impact of top-down interventions alone versus in
combination with parental involvement, this section investigates further some behaviors of the ZAP
and CISCO heads. We first look at how the different interventions affect the frequency of their
school supervision. Then, we study the effect of the ZAP intervention on how ZAP heads allocate
their efforts across supervising different types of schools under them.
We find that all the AGEMAD interventions lead to more school visits by the ZAP head, but
(s)he does not hold more meetings with the local community. Specifically, AGEMAD schools and
schools in AGEMAD ZAPs receive more frequent visits from the authorities. Panel E of Table 5
presents the impact of the AGEMAD treatments on the number of days since the last visit from the
ZAP and CISCO. It is not surprising that CISCO heads tend to visit schools less than ZAP heads.
On average, the last visit is 0.32 standard deviations more recent in AGEMAD schools than in
comparison schools, and 0.3 standard deviations more recent in schools of treated ZAPs (treatment
2). Despite this evidence of more visits from the authorities, we still find no improvement in
pedagogical practices at treatment 2 schools, implying that monitoring from the ZAP head does
not appear effective.
In addition, we look at a few self-reported behaviors of ZAP heads from the ZAP questionnaire.
The results from this analysis suggest that treatment ZAPs (treatment groups 2 or 3) do not hold
more meetings with the local community and the school board. To reconcile this result with the
above finding on more ZAP visits from the school questionnaire, one possible interpretation is that
treated ZAP heads exercise more school visits but ignore the accountability channel of involving
the village community.
In terms of effort allocation by the ZAP head, treated ZAPs were given information on the
performance of schools in their jurisdiction. As described in section 2.3.1, the report cards classify
schools in each ZAP into four categories: exceptional, in difficulty, satisfactory, and disappointing.
We expect treated ZAPs to provide differentially more support to schools in difficulty and excep-
tional schools than to satisfactory schools if they want to increase overall performance in the ZAP.
In contrast to the spirit promoted in AGEMAD report cards, we do not find strong evidence for
better allocation of efforts by the ZAP heads toward "schools in difficulty."
Table 6 presents the effects of the ZAP intervention on the number of meetings and visits that
each school receives from the ZAP head in year 1, interacted with the school's initial performance
category. Schools are categorized by three indicators prior to the program: net exit rate, 9 primary-
cycle exam pass rate, and repetition rate. Each column in this table represents a regression. The
estimates on the school category terms suggest that exceptional schools and schools in difficulty
in the comparison group tend to receive fewer meetings and visits from the ZAP administrator
than satisfactory schools. Coefficients on the interaction terms tell us, if anything, the opposite of
what we expected although the estimates are statistically insignificant. In general, treated ZAP
heads have even relatively fewer interactions with exceptional and difficulty schools than with their
satisfactory schools. They did not seem to act based on the information provided to them on their
schools' performance.
2.5.3 Student Attendance and Dropouts
With the CISCO and ZAP interventions doing little to affect routine activities at the school, it is
not surprising that we find no evidence for their impact on student attendance. Student attendance
during the school year was collected by surveyors during unannounced school visits. We have three
measures of attendance rates: "classroom count" is at the classroom level, while the other two
measures are at the school level. "Surveyor reported" attendance rate is the ratio of the number of
students in the whole school that the surveyor can quickly see upon arrival, divided by enrollment
of the classes in session. Table 7 reports the treatment effects on attendance, for each of the
three measures. As shown in columns 3, 4, and 6, the district and subdistrict intervention dummies
always have coefficients statistically indistinguishable from zero, and smaller than that of the school
intervention.
The school intervention, on the other hand, led to some changes in behaviors. We have seen
that there are better pedagogical practices at AGEMAD schools, so we would expect the treatment
9Net exit can be understood as dropout rate. For terminology purposes, the Ministry calls this measure net exit
since schools only report enrollment at the beginning and at the end of the year. We only know how many children
have left each school on net, but not whether some have transferred or dropped out completely. Student transfers
are rare in Madagascar, so net exit from school is almost identical to the dropout rate.
effects to translate into improved student participation at school, including regular attendance and
less dropout at the end of the school year, and improved learning. Student attendance rate (in
percent) is overall better in AGEMAD schools and not in the other treatments. As shown in
Table 7, AGEMAD schools have 4.29 percentage points higher attendance in the director's record
compared to the control group average of 87%. Classroom count attendance also has a positive
treatment coefficient, but not statistically significant. The regression using the surveyor's estimate
of attendance also has insignificant treatment coefficients.
The general observation from this experiment is the lack of impact in the top-down interventions,
but the school intervention worked. One exception to this general observation is the result on
self-reported dropout rate. Madagascar's administrative data, reported by the schools themselves,
reveals positive treatment effects on student performance at the end of year 1, as displayed in Table
8.10 AGEMAD schools perform on average 0.17 standard deviations higher than the comparison
schools, in terms of exam attendance rate, pass rate and dropout. Grade repetition in year 2 is
also 5.1 percentage points lower, with both estimates statistically significant. In these regressions,
the district and subdistrict interventions have an equally strong positive impact as the school-level
intervention. This result diverges from the evidence on the other outcome measures we have thus
far. One possible explanation is that self-reported dropout rates are relatively easy to manipulate on
the statistical form submitted to the Ministry, as opposed to teachers' lesson planning practices or
student test scores measured by a third party. Even if there is no true reduction in dropout rates,
schools in the treated districts, possibly feeling they were under extra scrutiny by the Ministry,
might have reported better rates.
10 This table reports OLS results, and they are similar when we run a difference-in-differences regression by including
the pre-AGEMAD values of these outcome variables. So we report OLS to be consistent with the rest of the paper.
2.5.4 Learning
To investigate the program effects on the intensive margin of learning, we exploit Grade 4 student
test score data from the achievement test at the end of year 2. Table 9 displays regression results
of equations (2.1) and (2.2), in which the dependent variable is normalized test score. As shown in
columns 2, 3, and 5, treatments solely at the CISCO or ZAP levels both have close to zero impacts,
and the estimates are insignificant. This finding is not surprising given that there is no evidence
for improvement in teacher behaviors in these two top-down treatment groups.
On the other hand, the magnitudes of regression (1) coefficient estimates suggest that students
in the AGEMAD reinforced schools perform 0.095 standard deviations better than those in the
control schools. Regression (2) attempts to alleviate the power issue by pooling treatments 1 and
2 together. The coefficient on Treatment 3 (AGEMAD schools) is significant at the 10% level.
This result on learning is consistent with the general distinction in treatment effects between the
top-down interventions alone and in combination with the school intervention.
This impact of the school intervention on the total score reflects impacts on math and Mala-
gasy subject scores, with the exception of French not improving at all in AGEMAD schools. Math
scores improve by 0.12 standard deviations, while Malagasy scores improve by 0.08 standard devi-
ations. But in the Madagascar context, teachers do not master French very well. The AGEMAD
interventions, as designed, do not help them teach better something they do not know so well
themselves.
2.6 Conclusion
This study contributes to a growing quest to understand better which kinds of top-down or partic-
ipatory programs might or might not work to improve service quality. We provide evidence from a
large randomized experiment in Madagascar's public primary schools. This AGEMAD program had
two levels of top-down interventions within the current system, where it distributed operational
tools to enable better school monitoring by the district and subdistrict heads. Some randomly
selected schools received the school-level treatment on top of the above. As in several other par-
ticipatory programs, the school intervention here organized accountability meetings between the
school and the parents to discuss information on the school report card, and encouraged the es-
tablishment of an action plan for the school. We expect the different AGEMAD interventions to
influence first-hands the teachers' behaviors if monitoring by the administrators or by the parents
is effective, and in turn influence students' learning.
We find that the top-down policy design with mediated control within the system by itself
does not seem effective. Providing tools and school information to higher-level bureaucrats did not
appear to have much impact on the schools and students under them. While the subdistrict heads
claimed that they visited their schools more often, they did not hold more meetings to involve
the local community into monitoring the school. There is no evidence of improvement in teaching
practices and learning outcomes in these treatment groups.
On the contrary, the interventions down to the school level with beneficiary control had positive
impacts. Teacher behaviors improved for some teaching tasks, such as planning lessons and giving
evaluation quizzes and tests. Other tasks, less likely to show up in the book records, did not
improve: teacher attendance or communication with the parents and the director. On balance,
student outcomes still improved in these treated schools. In particular, test scores increased by 0.1
standard deviations after two years. This result suggests that teaching activities (lesson planning
and student assessment) are important inputs in influencing student learning.
In sum, the top-down interventions in Madagascar seem ineffective in monitoring the school.
While we have seen evidence that external auditors can successfully monitor service delivery, it
remains a challenge to depend on bureaucrats in the system to perform that job. In this context, it is
the school-level intervention with beneficiary monitoring that worked to hold the school accountable
and affected teaching activities and learning.
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Figure 1: School District Map of Madagascar
Notes: The shaded areas are the 30 school districts in our study sample. The darker ones
are the treated CISCOs.
Table 1: Experimental Design
Sample of observationsSample of observations Description of interventionsCISCOs ZAPs Schools
1721Comparison 15 207 (303) No intervention
1314Treatment 1 170 (303) ISCO-level intervention(303)
Treatment 2 15 CISCO + ZAP-level interventions(303)
89
303 CISCO + ZAP + School-level
(303) interventions
Notes: In parentheses are numbers of schools in the follow-up sample for data collection
Table 2: Baseline School Characteristics
Comparison Treatment 3- Treatment 2- Treatment 1-
Group Mean Comparison Comparison Comparison Obs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Followup sample
Enrollment 239.465 -4.785 -25.323 -39.267 1212
(28.21) (24.89) (23.25)
Repetition Rate 0.177 0.037 0.022 0.029 1212
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
No. of Class Sections 5.693 -0.017 -0.35 -0.366 1212
(0.30) (0.25) (0.24)
No. of Teachers 4.413 0.033 -0.383 -0.234 1212
(0.41) (0.33) (0.34)
Panel B: Sample of treated districts
Treatment 3 Treatment 2- Treatment 1-
Group Mean Treatment 3 Treatment 3 Obs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Net Exit Rate 5.872 0.931 0.729 873
(1.10) (1.11)
CEPE Exam Pass Rate 66.260 -1.375 -2.572 707
(3.22) (3.29)
Notes: Panel A reports mean differences across groups for all 1212 schools in the followup sample.
Panel B reports mean differences in indicators for which we have baseline data for only the 15 treated CISCOs.
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the CISCO level
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 3: Attrition in Endline Test Scores
Comparison Treatment 3- Treatment 2-
Group Mean Comparison Comparison
Treatment 1-
Comparison
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Percent Attrition 0.132 0.007 -0.005 0.002
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Difference in pretest -0.068 -0.143 0.002 -0.012
Attriters - Stayers (0.08) (0.10) (0.08)
Difference in proportion of males -0.013 0.037 0.011 0.019
Attriters - Stayers (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Notes: N=24341
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the CISCO level.
Attrition rates in posttest data are at the individual level.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 4: Teacher Attendance and Practices
Endline Regression (1) Regression (2)
C.Group Any
Mean Treatment 3 Treatment 2 Treatment 1 Treatment 3 Treatment Obs.
Dependent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Teacher presence
Director reported during
random visit (teacher-level)
Director's book record
Surveyor reported during
random visit
0.903
(0.008)
0.939
(0.007)
0.974
(0.005)
Panel B: Teachers' lesson planning practices
Prepared a lesson for today 0.798
(0.012)
Discussed lesson plan 0.835
with director (0.011)
Made weekly lesson plans 0.822
(0.012)
Average Effect (in sd)
Panel C: Teachers' student evaluation practices
Evaluated student's learning 0.736 (
last week (0.014) ((
Gave bimonthly exams
Average Effect (in sd)
0.967
(0.006)
C0(
(((
-0.03
(0.030)
0.012
(0.020)
-0.022
(0.018)
0.093
(0.061)
0.065
(0.083)
0.104
(0.040)**
0.260
(0.117)*
).105
).140)
).004
.011)
J.141
).168)
Panel D: Teachers' communication
Communicated with parents
about student performance
Communicated with parents
this month
Communicated with director
about students
Communicated with director
this month
Average Effect (in sd)
0.943
(0.007)
0.580
(0.065)
0.900
(0.009)
0.991
(0.003)
0.017
(0.027)
-0.056
(0.059)
0.01
(0.017)
-0.098
(0.100)
-0.049
(0.086)
-0.021
(0.019)
0.014
(0.016)
-0.017
(0.012)
0.017
(0.064)
0.014
(0.082)
0.046
(0.045)
0.077
(0.126)
0.077
(0.137)
-0.003
(0.012)
0.086
(0.159)
-0.003
(0.029)
-0.085
(0.062)
-0.001
(0.018)
-0.119
(0.103)
-0.106
(0.084)
-0.007
(0.021)
0.008
(0.018)
-0.015
(0.010)
0.05
(0.063)
0.037
(0.081)
0.04
(0.042)
0.124
(0.119)
0.08
(0.138)
-0.017
(0.017)
0.050
(0.165)
0.013
(0.024)
-0.118
(0.068)+
0.019
(0.015)
-0.143
(0.105)
-0.095
(0.087)
-0.015
(0.022)
0.001
(0.009)
-0.007
(0.014)
0.06
(0.018)**
0.04
(0.023)+
0.061
(0.016)**
0.160
(0.046)**
0.027
(0.017)
0.013
(0.011)
0.073
(0.042)+
0.012
(0.02)
0.045
(0.030)
0.001
(0.009)
0.032
-0.028
0.051
(0.035)
-0.014
(0.019)
0.011
(0.017)
-0.016
(0.009)
0.033
(0.062)
0.025
(0.080)
0.043
(0.043)
0.100
(0.121)
0.078
(0.137)
-0.01
(0.013)
0.069
(0.161)
0.005
(0.023)
-0.101
(0.063)
0.009
(0.015)
-0.131
(0.103)
-0.101
(0.084)
5370
1061
1069
4184
4184
4184
4184
4184
4184
4184
4184
4184
4184
4184
4184
Panel E: Classroom learning distribution
Fraction of students scoring 0.580
beneath the mean last exam (0.065)
-0.185 -0.164
(0.095)+ (0.094)+
Notes: Col. (1) reports the endline mean in the comparison group.
-0.131
(0.105)
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the CISCO level. Observations are weighted
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
-0.036 -0.149
(0.025) (0.096)
by the probability of selection.
All regressions include controls for the month during which the school was surveyed but not shown.
Regressions of teacher practices also have controls for teacher's age, age^2, teacher's salary, and teaching degree.
Treatment 1 is an indicator for whether the school is in a treated CISCO. Treatment 2 is an indicator for whether
school is in a treated ZAP. Treatment 3 is an indicator for whether school itself received AGEMAD interventions.
4027
. . o
Table 5: School Functioning and Director Practices
Endline Regression (1) Regression (2)
C.Group Any
Mean Treatment 3 Treatment 2 Treatment 1 Treatment 3 Treatment Obs.
Dependent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Observations of school at visit
Students playing in the hall 0.084 0.008 0.017 0.034 -0.018 0.025 1070
(0.017) (0.032) (0.029) (0.035) (0.02) (0.029)
Teachers in the hall 0.096 -0.009 0.011 -0.003 -0.013 0.004 1070
(0.018) (0.029) (0.028) (0.033) (0.02) (0.028)
Average Effect (in sd) -0.004 0.050 0.052 -0.055 0.051 1070
(0.087) (0.078) (0.104) (0.064) (0.083)
Panel B: Observations of classrooms at visit (classroom-level)
Classroom with a teacher 0.934 -0.02 -0.02 -0.013 -0.004 -0.016 4316
(0.007) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.020)
Classroom with a lesson in 0.843 -0.014 -0.019 -0.01 0.001 -0.015 4316
progress (0.011) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.046)
Average Effect (in sd) -0.056 -0.062 -0.038 -0.006 -0.050 4316
(0.097) (0.077) (0.082) (0.059) (0.076)
Panel C: Director's control and reporting practices
Teacher absences reported to 0.265 -0.043 -0.088 -0.076 0.039 -0.082 1202
Cisco (0.026) (0.125) (0.130) (0.128) (0.04) (0.129)
Teacher absences reported to 0.833 -0.068 -0.131 -0.027 0.011 -0.08 1202
Zap (0.022) (0.069) (0.087) (0.067) (0.023) (0.076)
Director checks student roll 0.231 0.014 0.027 -0.012 0.007 0.008 1202
call at least weekly (0.024) (0.085) (0.060) (0.062) (0.035) (0.060)
Director records teacher 0.901 0.085 0.054 0.07 0.023 0.062 1202
absences (0.019) (0.034)* (0.036) (0.035)* (0.012)+ (0.035)+
Director records monthly 0.769 -0.002 -0.027 -0.08 0.051 -0.053 1202
student attendance (0.026) (0.066) (0.069) (0.078) (0.038) (0.071)
Average Effect (in sd) 0.030 -0.057 -0.030 0.074 -0.044 1202
(0.092) (0.097) (0.090) (0.039)+ (0.092)
Panel D: Meetings to discuss school matters
Days elapsed since last teacher 25.538 1.702 2.849 4.975 -2.212 3.906 1195
meeting (2.710) (3.863) (4.131) (4.251) (4.47) (3.445)
Days elapsed since last meeting 51.682 -1.79 -1.713 -6.371 2.291 -4.062 1195
with community (5.269) (8.971) (7.852) (7.831) (6.106) (7.678)
No parent conference this 0.481 0.114 0.131 0.145 -0.024 0.138 1195
past month (0.029) (0.090) (0.090) (0.091) (0.031) (0.087)
Average Effect (in sd) 0.079 0.100 0.099 -0.020 0.099 1195
(0.077) (0.063) (0.075) (0.060) (0.065)
Panel E: Visits from
authorities
Days elapsed since Cisco visit 294.352 -105.423 -75.272 -33.38 -51.06 -54.979 541
(67.803) (68.447) (83.113) (72.301) (36.284) (71.137)
Days elapsed since Zap visit 88.907 -31.715 -35.608 -20.836 -3.633 -28.208 541
(10.387) (8.283)** (10.739)** (10.813)+ (5.508) (9.872)**
Average Effect (in sd) -0.318 -0.309 -0.169 -0.080 -0.240 541
(0.105)** (0.126)** (0.117) (0.040)* (0.110)*
Notes: Col. (1) reports the endline mean in the comparison group.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the CISCO level.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
All regressions include controls for the month during which the school was surveyed but not shown.
Treatment 1 is an indicator for whether the school is in a treated CISCO. Treatment 2 is an indicator for whether
school is in a treated ZAP. Treatment 3 is an indicator for whether school itself received AGEMAD interventions.
Table 6: How Frequently Does the Zap Head Interact with Schools of Different Categories?
Dependent variables
Schools categorized by
Exceptional
Difficulty
Disappointing
Treatment Zap
Exceptional*Treatment Zap
Difficulty*Treatment Zap
Disappointing*Treatment Zap
Constant
Observations
Number of Meetings in year 1
(Comparison Group Mean = 1.582)
Net Exit Pass Rate Repetition Rate
(1) (2) (3)
0.183 -0.22 -0.072
(0.155) (0.158) (0.096)
-0.161 -0.164 0.011
(0.162) (0.112) (0.127)
0.188 -0.255 .0
(0.316) (0.161) (0.085)
0.259 0.238 0.365
(0.344) (0.337) (0.203)
-0.251 0.038 -0.32
(0.358) (0.296) (0.173)
-0.172 -0.269 -0.369
(0.360) (0.360) (0.221)
-0.247
(0.502)
0.75
(0.252)*
1018
-0.213
(0.435)
1.066
(0.326)**
785
-0.373
(0.196)
0.842
(0.263)**
1020
Number of Visits in year 1
(Comparison Group Mean = 3.098)
Net Exit Pass Rate Repetition Rate
(4) (5) (6)
-0.553 -1.228 -0.932
(0.479) (0.463)* (0.520)
-1.153 -1.844 -0.883
(0.426)* (0.695)* (0.673)
-0.196 -1.397 -0.394
(0.555) (0.514)* (0.619)
-0.435 -0.821 -0.347
(0.941) -1.13 (1.286)
-0.365 0.02 -0.563
(0.711) -0.725 (0.989)
-0.211 0.319 -0.299
(0.626) -1.047 (1.091)
0.187
-0.899
3.033
(0.898)**
785
-0.434
(1.069)
2.194
(0.834)*
1020
-0.398
(0.662)
2.072
(0.697)*
1018
Notes: Each column is a regression of meetings or visits by ZAP head. The regressors include different categories
of schools ("exceptional, difficulty, disappointing" with omitted category: satisfactory).
Schools can be categorized by net exit, exam pass rate or repetition rate, hence the corresponding columns.
Net exit can be understood as dropout rate. It is the difference between school enrollment
at the beginning and at the end of the year, divided by initial enrollment.
Standard errors reported in parenthesis, clustered at the CISCO level
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
All regressions control for ZAP head's years of experience, experience squared, and having an advanced teaching degree.
Treatment Zaps are those in treatment groups 2 and 3. Year 1 refers to the first year of the interventions, 2005-2006.
Table 7: Treatment Effects on Student Attendance
Endline Regression (1) Regression (2)
C.Group Any
Mean Treatment 3 Treatment 2 Treatment 1 Treatment 3 Treatment Obs.
Dependent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Student attendance (in %)
Surveyor reported 80.113 -1.156 -1.94 -1.508 0.567 -1.725 945
(1.293) (4.583) (3.645) (3.484) (1.922) (3.524)
Classroom count 85.333 2.394 1.897 1.662 0.613 1.783 5097
(classroom-level) (0.492) (2.331) (2.067) (2.410) (0.777) (2.195)
Director's book record 86.589 4.29 1.67 3.12 1.895 2.397 901
(0.784) (1.96)* (2.310) (2.050) (0.643)** (2.155)
Notes: Col. (1) reports the endline mean in the comparison group.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the CISCO level. Observations are weighted by the probability of selection.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
All regressions include controls for the month during which the school was surveyed, and index for school infrastructure
Treatment 1 is an indicator for whether the school is in a treated CISCO. Treatment 2 is an indicator for whether
school is in a treated ZAP. Treatment 3 is an indicator for whether school itself received AGEMAD interventions.
Table 8: Treatment Effects on Repetition, Dropouts and CEPE Results
Endline Regression (1) Regression (2)
C.Group Any
Mean Treatment 3 Treatment 2 Treatment 1 Treatment 3 Treatment Obs.
Dependent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: End-year 1 school performance
CEPE exam pass rate 0.691 0.004 0.039 0.061 -0.046 0.050 1113
(0.016) (0.053) (0.049) (0.048) (0.020)* (0.047)
Net exit from Grade 5 0.087 -0.076 -0.063 -0.048 -0.02 -0.056 1113
(0.008) (0.019)** (0.020)** (0.019)* (0.019) (0.018)**
Net exit from all grades 0.061 -0.017 -0.016 -0.024 0.003 -0.02 1113
(0.007) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013)+ (0.006) (0.012)+
CEPE exam attendance rate 0.899 0.05 0.038 0.033 0.014 0.036 1113
(0.010) (0.030)+ (0.030) (0.028) (0.02) (0.027)
Average Effect (in sd) 0.174 0.183 0.206 -0.021 0.195 1113
(sign of net exit reversed) (0.089)+ (0.088)* (0.090)* (0.038) (0.085)*
Panel B: Grade repetition rates over time
Year 1 grade repetition 0.220 -0.002 0.012 0 -0.008 0.006 1118
(0.006) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.008) (0.020)
Year 2 grade repetition 0.226 -0.051 -0.026 -0.045 -0.016 -0.035 1085
(0.007) (0.019)* (0.019) (0.020)* (0.007)* (0.019)
Notes: Col. (1) reports the endline mean in the comparison group.
Net exit can be understood as dropout rate. It is the difference between school enrollment
at the beginning and at the end of the year, divided by initial enrollment.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the CISCO level. Observations are weighted
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
CEPE is the primary cycle exam at the end of Grade 5
by the probability of selection.
Treatment 1 is an indicator for whether the school is in a treated CISCO. Treatment 2 is an indicator for whether
school is in a treated ZAP. Treatment 3 is an indicator for whether school itself received AGEMAD interventions.
Year 1 refers to the first year of the interventions, 2005-2006. Year 2 is 2006-2007.
Table 9: Treatment Effects on Endline Student Test Scores
Regression (1) Regression (2)
Treatment 3 Treatment 2 Treatment 1 Treatment 3 Any Treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variables: Normalized endline test scores
Total Score 0.095 0.012 -0.013 0.095 0
(0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.050)+ (0.10)
French 0.035 -0.015 -0.017 0.051 -0.016
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.05) (0.10)
Malagasy 0.115 0.046 0.018 0.083 0.032
(0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.040)* (0.09)
Math 0.095 -0.006 -0.041 0.119 -0.024
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.047)* (0.10)
Notes: N= 21126. Test scores are normalized by subtracting the mean and divided by standard deviation of
control group's baseline scores. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the Cisco level
Observations are weighted by the probability of selection.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Treatment 1 is an indicator for whether the school is in a treated CISCO. Treatment 2 is an indicator for whether
school is in a treated ZAP. Treatment 3 is an indicator for whether school itself received AGEMAD interventions.
Appendix Figure 1: Sample School Report Card
DIRESEB:
CISCO:
ZAP:
SCHOOL REPORT CARD: YEAR 2005
(Based on the information the school submitted in FFA 2004-2005)
SCHOOL: SECTOR:
SCHOOL CODE:
ACADEMIC RESULTS
Repetition rate
Your school Your CISCO
CP1
CP2
CE
CM1
CM2
Average
CM2 enrollment
Present at CEPE exam
Passed the CEPE
CEPE pass rate
% of CM2 passed CEPE
STUDENTS AND TEACHERS
Your school
Nb. Students
Nb. Teachers
Holding classes
Civil service teachers
FRAM
Supplements
Not holding class
Total
Your school Your CISCO
Nb. Students/teacher
% of FRAM (contract) teachers
% teachers not holding class
WHERE DOES YOUR SCHOOL STAND IN TERMS OF PERFORMANCE AND RESOURCES?
Results Nb. Students/teacher School Category
MENRS
Rate of net exit
Your school Your CISCO
CPI
CP2
CE
CM1
CM2
Average
CEPE results
Your school Your CISCO
Your school Your CISCO
Rate of net exit
Repetition rate
CEPE results
Nb. Students/teacher
Better than CISCO average Less than CISCO average Exceptional
Better than CISCO average Better than CISCO average Satisfactory
Less than CISCO average Less than CISCO average In Difficulty
Less than CISCO average Better than CISCO average Disappointing
Rate of net exit
Appendix Table 1: AGEMAD Tools for Use by Teachers
AGEMAD Tool
Objective Activities
Code Description Theme Periodicity
Bimonthly lesson plan At start of
Plan time use and calendar E1A/PED for the entire school Pedagogy school year
Provide overview of of lessons year
the year's curriculum At start of each
and promote Prepare lessons Weekly lesson plan for Pedagogy bimonthly
n pE1B/PED Pedagogy bimonthly
systematic lesson Track pupils' reception of bimonthly periods period
planning the lessons
E2/PED Individual lesson plan Pedagogy Daily
Prepare and mark tests Record of bimonthly
Put focus on student Record test scores test scores After eachE3/EVA Evaluation After eachlearning Identify and help lagging (Cahier de notes de bimonthly test
pupils class)
Individual pupil report
Mobilize parental Inform parents about pupils' card End of each
support for academic progress in school E4/EVA (Bulletin individuel de Evaluation bimonthly
excellence notes) period
Monitor pupils' attendance
Reduce student Detect possible attendance Class attendance
absenteeism problems and their causes E5/APP register Time for learning Daily
Take remedial action
Account for teacher
absences
Reduce teacher Detect possible attendance E6/APP Teacher's personal Time for learning Each occasion
absenteeism problems and their causes leave/travel record card of absence
Take remedial action
Appendix Table 2: AGEMAD Tools for Use by School Directors
AGEMAD tool
Objective Activities
Code Description Theme Periodicity
Registre matricule Each time a
Ensure proper Keep up-to-date register of pupils at the Dl/ADM (National Printer Administration new pupil
registration of pupils school document) registers
D2/APP Attendance Time for Daily
Reduce teacher register learning
absenteeism Monitor presence of teachersabsenteeism D3/APP Summary table of Time for At end of
teacher absences learning each month
Record summary of pupil attendance
records
Summary table of Time for At end ofReduce pupil Review attendance record and assess D4/APP monthly record of Time for At eah month
absenteeism possible problems and their causes pupil absenteeism learning each month
Take remedial action
Call periodic staff meetings (Conseil
des Maltres) At end ofFocus on progress of Summary of Evaluation each
student learning at Track student learning, note strengths D5/EVA student test scores bimonthly
the school and weaknesses, and plan to implement period
remedial action as needed
Use school's data on student flow to
identify and address possible problems
Improve school's Ensure application of grade to grade D6/EVA Student flow table Evaluation End of eac
internal efficiency school yeartransition criteria (i.e., systbme de
cours) a/
Organize meetings with parents and
teachers, FAF and FRAM At each
Strengthen school's- Sensitize parents of pupils at the school D7/PART Community Community meeting
partnership with the meeting form relations with the
local community Work with parents to prepare a contrat communityprogramme de r6ussite scolaire
(CPRS)
Assign teaching duties among staff, and
Improve conditions allocate classrooms and teaching Organization of At start of
for learning at the materials; and select teachers for in- D8/PED pedagogical Pedagogy school year
school service training, arrangements
Study and display in public area the
school report card
Update school's performance indicators School report card
Improve At end of
performance of the Discuss the school report card with D9/TDB (Tableau de bord Focus on results school year
school community and use it to inform de l'dcole)
development of a school improvement
plan (contract programme) for
implementation
a/ Automatic promotion between grades 1 and 2 and between grades 4 and 5.
Appendix Table 3: AGEMAD Tools for Use by ZAP Heads
AGEMAD Tool
Objective Activities
Code Description Theme Periodicity
Improve management of Keep up-to-date inventory of Z1/ADM List of all schools Administration At start of
schools in ZAP schools in the ZAP in the ZAP school year
Improve the education Ensure timely and complete Checklist of data At start andinformation system collection of school data on the Z2/STA Statistics end of schoolinformation system collection
census forms year
Enrollments byDetermine number of pupils in Enrollments byImprove pupils' access each functioning school to receive Z3/STA school and At start of
to pedagogical materials a scho tioning school to receive distribution of the school year
school kits
Aide mimoire ofTake stock of in-service teacher Aide mmire f After each
training ee Z4/FOR in-service teacher Training training eventtraining (fourndes pidagogiques) training eventtraining event
Supervise and provide pedagogical
support to teachers in schools
Strengthen teacher Provide feedback to school
competencies director Pedagogical After eachTrack assimilation of training Z5/PED supervision and Pedagogy school visitprovided support form
Identify potential areas of
additional training to help teachers
become more effective
Track expenditure against grants On each
provided through the Caisse Ecole Z6/ADM Caisse Ecole form Administration school visitImprove management at and Caisse Cantine
school finances
Ensure public posting of the Z7/ADM Caisse Cantine Administration On each
expenditures form school visit
Maintain relations with the
Strengthen school- community Z8/PART Community Community On each
community partnership Visit/meet community partners for meeting form relations school visit
education
Take note of each school's
progress from year to year ZAP report card At start ofImprove performance of Compare schools in the ZAP, Z9/TDB (Tableau de bord Focus on results
schools in the ZAP identify lagging schools, and plan de la ZAP) school year
extra support and attention for
such schools
Appendix Table 4: AGEMAD Tools for Use by CISCO Heads
AGEMAD Tool
Objective Activities
Code Description Theme Periodicity
Take stock of existing
Manage teacher deployment of teachers Teacher transfer Administration End of school year
transfers Summarize and process master sheet
transfer requests
Inform the Ministry about
requirements for school kits
Improve schooling and other school supplies C2/ADM Pedagogical supplies Administration Before start of
conditions form school year
Distribute school kits,
textbooks and other supplies
C3A/ADM Caisse Ecole follow- Administration End of second
up sheet bimonthly period
Distribute the Caisse Ecole Caisse Cantine Administration End of second
Improve of and Caisse Cantine grants follow-up sheet bimonthly period
management of
school finances Ensure follow-up on C4A/ADM Caisse Ecole Administration On occasion of
utilization of the grants verification form each visit to ZAP
Caisse Cantine Administration On occasion of
verification form each visit to ZAP
Planning sheet for in-
Identify teacher training CFOR service teacher Before each
needs and organize training training (journ6es Training training event
events p6dagogiques)
Implement post-training Follow-up sheet for Before and after
follow-up C6/FOR in-service teacher Training each training event
Strengthen teacher training
competencies Plan school visits to provide
in-service support, giving
priority to the schools in Class observation
difficulty C7/PED grid (Grille Pedagogy On each school
Provide feedback to school d observation de visit
personnel based on classe)
systematic on-site recording
of classroom practices
Evaluate outcomes across
ZAPs and schools and
identify lagging units for
Improve extra support and attention CISCO report card At start of schoolperformance of C8/TDB (Tableau de bord de Focus on results
schools in CISCO Analyze possible sources of la CISCO) year
difficulty in lagging units
and plan remedial action for
implementation
Chapter 3
Incentives against Corruption in Acute Health Care in
Vietnam
3.1 Introduction
Corruption is widely regarded as an important issue in the developing world. The efficiency costs
of corruption may be a strong barrier to growth in these countries.' Corruption involved in health
care provision, in particular, may limit redistribution and weaken service delivery, risking human
lives directly. Yet, in the public health sector, illegal informal payments for health care services
at public facilities are prevalent in many developing countries (Lewis 2006). These payments are
made under the table to doctors and nurses, sometimes to get the most basic services that patients
are supposed to receive for free. The poor and credit-constrained who cannot offer such payments
may fail to receive timely medical treatments.
This paper studies corruption in situations with high rents to extract, in particular informal
payments for acute health care. Let us consider acute conditions like a heart attack, which tend to
be observable to both the patient's family and the doctor. Acute patients may be more susceptible
to corruption than patients of chronic conditions since they would gain more from a treatment and
thus have higher willingness to pay. Meanwhile, acute cases also involve a high mortality risk
without timely medical attention, so refusing to treat them can leave serious medical consequences
or even cost lives. Bureaucrats might get disutility from letting their patients die, or are sensitive
to existing incentives against doing so. It is therefore not clear a priori if acute cases would face
more or less informal payments than chronic ones. I demonstrate these possibilities in a simple
bargaining model, which predicts that acute patients pay less where the doctor's outside option for
1For example, this point is made by Mauro (1995) and Rose-Ackerman (2004).
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not treating them is sufficiently low.
To investigate this relationship empirically, I examine micro data on informal payments (or
side payments) during inpatient visits in Vietnam. This is a context where the government itself
recognizes in its health report that substantial informal payments exist at hospitals and may exceed
official payments, though the exact amount is unknown. The Vietnamese government also considers
informal payments a sensitive issue that should be further studied to reduce the burden on the poor
(the very poor are supposed to be fully subsidized in health care) and to improve service quality
(Ministry of Health 2003). The Vietnam National Health Survey 2001-2002 provides a direct
measure of corruption at hospitals in the form of illegal side payments to doctors and nurses, above
and beyond the official fees set by the government. Exploiting variation across visits within the same
hospital, I estimate a large reduction in side payments (9.46 thousand dongs or 18%) associated
with acute visits relative to non-acute ones, despite the similar official fees. Acute patients are
also 8 percentage points less likely to pay bribes at all. This relationship is strong even at facilities
where side payments in non-acute care are large, suggesting that otherwise "greedy" bureaucrats
might still refrain from life-risking corrupt activities in this context.
There are several interpretations for the empirical negative relationship between side payment
and acute condition. Since acute patients presumably have a higher private value of treatment,
the result that they pay a lower price implies sufficiently low expected payoffs to doctors for not
treating them. One interpretation of the low payoff is that the doctors themselves get disutility
from denying treatment in acute care. For example, altruistic doctors do not like the possibility
of letting their patient die. Or doctors who have a private practice are concerned about losing
reputation from failures to treat acute cases. Another interpretation of the low payoff is due to
external incentives against neglecting acute patients, already enforced in the current institutions.
Specifically in Vietnam, promotion reviews for doctors are supposed to take into account successful
treatments of acute cases. If well-enforced, this policy gives one reason for doctors not to demand
excessive bribes in acute care. The government also has a central audit agency to monitor medical
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practices at all health facilities. The court system provides another possible channel of incentives
for doctors. If the patient's family sues the doctor and the hospital for negligence or malpractice in
causing the patient's death or health damages, medical reports and testimonies will be examined in
court. Punishment consequences include suspension of the doctor's practice license and monetary
compensations. This situation is particularly undesirable since there is no malpractice insurance
in Vietnam.
I provide supporting evidence to suggest that response to incentives, among the above possibili-
ties, is one plausible interpretation of the lower side payments observed in acute care. To shed light
on this hypothesis, I compare payments by illness condition in presumably high-incentive versus
low-incentive facilities. Motivated by the model's prediction, I test for a larger reduction in side
payments in acute care at places where we would expect stronger incentives. I first investigate
bribe payments in the central cities, Hanoi and HoChiMinh City. This is where the legal system
and the media are most accessible, and where the central authorities and auditing bureaus are
located. I find that acute patients pay substantially less than non-acute patients in those central
cities (by 69000 dongs), compared to the non-central facilities. The differential propensity to pay
bribe at all is 20 percentage points. There is no strong reason to believe that doctors in Hanoi and
HoChiMinh City have such superior altruism that it drives this finding entirely. It is possible that
doctors there have more private practices and care more about reputation, or they are responding
to larger disincentives in the central cities for taking bribes from acute patients.
To exploit cleaner variation in incentives, I use the number of supervision visits each facility
receives as a measure of monitoring. Among all the commune facilities where this data is available,
the interactions of acute cases and audit visits are significantly negative in affecting side payments.
That means, the reduction in payments when a case is acute is stronger in well-audited facilities
than otherwise. For each additional audit visit, acute patients are 1 percentage point less likely
to pay bribe than non-acute patients to the same facility, and pay 0.2 percentage points less bribe
as a fraction of total payment. While I am not estimating directly a causal relationship between
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incentives and bribes, this paper finds that even very corrupt bureaucrats are sensitive to risking
people's lives in extracting bribes. Well-monitored bureaucrats seem particularly more sensitive
than the others. This result is indicative of doctors' reaction to incentives even in a corruptible
environment.
This study contributes to the literature on fighting corruption. While the theory for using
monitoring and incentives to control corruption dates back to Becker and Stigler (1974), the set
of empirical papers on this topic is limited. Evidence to date suggests that bureaucrats respond
to incentives against breaking the rules for money. Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003) shows that
procurement prices reported by hospitals in Buenos-Aires dropped significantly once an auditing
system was in place. Olken (2007) provides evidence from a field experiment in Indonesia that top-
down monitoring reduces corruption in road projects. Publishing transparent information about
funding for education in the newspapers reduced local capture of government funds in Uganda
(Reinikka and Svensson 2004).2
Aside from that, this paper also relates to the literature on bribes and discrimination in health
care. On the question of who is paying bribes, Hunt (2007) documents with data from Peru and
Uganda that the rich are more likely to pay bribes in health care, and conditional on that, pay larger
amounts.3 I find similar relationships in my data. On the question of what people are paying for,
Thompson and Xavier (2002) argues that bribes are paid in exchange for better quality of care,
faster admission in particular. They exploit variation across visits within the same hospital and
find that unofficial payments and wait time are negatively correlated in one hospital, and positively
correlated in another hospital.4 This correlation is not strong in either direction in the Vietnam
data.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents a simple model of
2In terms of cross-country evidence, Yang (2008) finds that countries implementing the private sector monitoring
program (called "hiring integrity") tend to collect more import duty later.
3Svensson (2003) shows this result in a sample of firms in Uganda.
4 For a large sample of firms in many countries, Kaufmann and Wei (1999) shows that self-reported time spent
with bureaucrats is positively correlated with perceived bribery.
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bargaining, highlighting the different payoffs for doctors in acute health care. In section 3.3, I
provide background information on the Vietnam health care system and informal payments, and
describe the data for analysis. Section 3.4 discusses the estimation strategy and empirical results.
The last section concludes.
3.2 A Model of Side Payment and Illness Condition
This simple model describes the Nash bargaining solution to determine prices in a transaction
between the doctor and a patient of acute or non-acute condition. The main idea of the model
is a tradeoff between the patient's value of treatment and the doctor's outside option in affecting
the total surplus from this transaction. The patient has a higher private benefit of being treated
for acute than non-acute illnesses. But if the expected payoff to the doctor for not treating acute
patients is sufficiently low, the model predicts lower side payments to doctors in acute cases.
Consider bargaining for side payments between a patient of a certain illness and a doctor. There
are 2 kinds of illnesses, observable to all parties: acute (A) or non-acute (NA). Both parties have a
discount factor P. There are 2 possible time periods for treatment, and by period 2, the doctor has
to treat a patient that has been to the hospital. There is no iinperfect information or uncertainty,
so bargaining is resolved in period 1.
An acute patient has the following private values of the treatment in either period: bA > 0 if
he receives the treatment in period 1; otherwise if he is treated in period 2, he gets bA = 0 since
he is likely to die then. For the doctor, he obtains a payment pA from the patient if he gives the
treatment. Otherwise, he is charged with a "fine" of F > 0 for not treating an acute patient in
period 1. The model's insights remain if instead, the fine happens in period 2 when the patient
dies, and F is the expected discounted value of the punishment. This exogeneous fine captures,
for example, any disutility of the doctor for letting an acute patient die without offering treatment,
loss of profit due to damaged reputation, or a punishment set by the government.
104
A non-acute patient has the follow private values: bNA if he gets the treatment in period 1;
otherwise if he is treated in period 2, he gets b A. Let us assume 0 < bN A < bN A since illnesses
are better treated early, but non-acute cases are not immediately life-threatening. For the doctor,
he receives a payment pNA if he treats the non-acute patient in period 1. Otherwise, his outside
option is 0 since in period 2, he has to give the patient the treatment.
Since there is surplus to be shared, consider Nash bargaining as a natural benchmark. Let ao
denote the patient's bargaining power. The resulting price in an acute case would be the solution
to the following problem:
max(bA - p A - b)A)a(pA 1-+ (3.1)
max(b- _ pA)a(pA + F)1-a (3.2)
PA
where the term in the first brackets is the payoff to the patient minus his outside option, and the
term in the second brackets is the payoff to the doctor minus his outside option.
Similarly for a non-acute case, pNA solves
max(bN A NA - bNA)a(pNA - 0)1-a (3.3)
pNA
The Nash bargaining solutions imply that prices are set such that the patient's share of the
total surplus is equal to his bargaining power
bA _ pA1= (3.4)
bNA _ pNA _- bNA
bNA - bNA
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For a given a, we can solve for the prices
pA = bA - a(b + F) (3.6)
pNA = (bNA _ bA)(1 _ ) (3.7)
The condition with which pNA > pA is
(bOA - ObNA)(1 a) > bA(1 - a) - aF (3.8)
F > [bA - (bNA - bNA) (1- a) (3.9)
The left hand side is the cost to the doctor of not treating acute cases. The first term on
the right hand side denotes the difference in values to the patient of getting treated now (rather
than his outside option) between the acute and non-acute cases. The second term is the relative
bargaining weights. When F is relatively large and this inequality is satisfied, acute patients have
to pay less than non-acute patients.
In the framework thus far, bargaining is resolved and treatment always takes place in period
1. In reality, some patients have to wait for treatment, possibly due to constrained capacity at the
hospital. It is worth discussing briefly what implications this has for the model. Suppose each
doctor has one acute patient and one non-acute patient, and can only treat one person in each
period. If he treats the non-acute first, his payoff is pNA - F. If he treats the acute first, his
payoff is pA since in period 2, the non-acute patient has to be treated and does not need to pay.
Given the expression for prices in equations 3.6 and 3.7, the doctor is better off taking his acute
patient first. The main insight is that the non-acute patient, treated later, now pays a lower price
than what he would have to pay if treated in period 1. Thus, when we later look at the difference
pNA _ pA in the data where capacity constraints play a role, this empirical estimate will be less
than the difference pNA _ pA in an environment without such constraints.
106
To sum up, while acute cases generally have a higher private benefit of treatment, they may
still face lower side payments in this model as long as there is sufficient cost to the doctor of letting
these patients die. The model also predicts that the difference in side payments pNA _ pA is larger
where F is higher. In the remaining sections, I will turn to the data from Vietnam to examine the
relationship between bribe payment and disease condition.
3.3 Background and Data
3.3.1 Health Care in Vietnam
The health care system in Vietnam has undergone major reforms since independence. Up until 1989,
health care was fully subsidized by the socialist government. In the midst of the liberalization
process, the government legalized private practice and started allowing partial fee collection by
hospitals to cover operational costs. Decree 95 in 1994 permits public hospitals to collect fees for
their own profit, under the condition that this fee schedule is within the official range of user fees
and approved by the Ministry of Health. 5
Today, health care providers include public and private hospitals, traditional healers, and phar-
macists. This paper focuses on public hospitals since this is where illegal side payments, above and
beyond the permitted official fees, are most common. The public system is hierarchical, with the
Ministry of Health in charge of making policies and managing service delivery. At the grassroots
level, a commune health care team typically consists of a doctor (or more if larger communes), a
nurse and/or a midwife, and village health workers. This network covers all communes and wards
throughout the country. Relative to other developing countries in the region, Vietnam has an
extensive commune-based health system and delivers many services at the front line. At higher
levels, there are usually one hospital per district, one or more provincial hospitals, and some spe-
5See Vietnam Health Report 2002 for more information on the health care system and health status in Vietnam
(Ministry of Health 2003).
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cialized health facilities. Overall, Vietnam has approximately 25 hospital beds and 6 physicians
per thousand population (World Health Organization 2008).
Base salaries of doctors and nurses at public hospitals are set by the government. The official
salary for a physician is $30-50 per month, and higher for management positions (real GDP per
capita was $400 in 2001). In addition, they received premiums for night shifts and for working in
remote areas or toxic environments. These premiums are again determined by the government.
In terms of financing, total health spending in the country is roughly 5-6% of GDP. Health
expenses were at $27 per year per person in 2005. Health expenditures come from the government
budget (26%), out-of-pocket payments (64%), and the rest from insurance plans (World Health
Organization 2008). Health insurance was first established in 1992. Nowadays, insurance is
mandatory for government employees and deducted directly from their paychecks. Others may
purchase voluntary health insurance. The very poor, disadvantaged population, and war veterans
receive state subsidies for health care either in the form of free insurance cards or reimbursement for
hospital expenses. The health survey data that I exploit in this paper, described below, indicate
that one third of the patients have some type of health insurance.
3.3.2 Informal Payment
While the Ministry of Health sets the official fees for different kinds of illnesses, anecdotal evidence
suggests that patients pay extra to jump the queue or get the medical staff's attention. The law
(Instruction 08/BYT-CT from the Ministry of Health, Jan. 2004) prohibits hospitals from charging
any fees other than the official fees as approved by the government. If caught, punishments to
doctors range from warning to dismissal from the job. Still, we see deviations from this regulation
in the data, thus suggesting there might be corruption and bribe taking. Informal payments may
be a significant contribution to the revenues of hospitals and health providers. To get a sense of the
magnitude, households report paying 14 times more at public facilities than what the government
reports receiving as fees. Taking into account unofficial payments, out-of-pocket financing might
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actually account for 80% of total health expenditure (Adams 2005).
3.3.3 Data
I use the Vietnam National Health Survey 2001-2002, conducted by the General Statistics Office
to collect nationally representative data on health status and health care usage. The entire survey
covers 36000 households in 406 urban and 794 rural communes. The inpatient module, relevant
for this paper, is part of the household questionnaire that the surveyor used to interview household
members at home. It asks for information on all inpatient visits by any member of the household
during the 12-month period prior to the interview. 6 If the patient undergoing inpatient care was
more than 16 years old and available, he or she was interviewed directly; otherwise, the household
head or the next-best respondent answered the survey on their behalf. 7438 households report
hospital use for inpatient care, and on average, 1.3 visits per household. Respondents report a
series of answers in connection with each visit: type and level of facilities, length of hospital stay,
wait time before admission, and official fees and side payments to doctors and nurses. Data on the
broad type of illness (acute, injury, or chronic) was collected, without any further details on each
illness condition.
The key variable is side payment, which records households' response to the following interview
question: "How much did you pay informally to the employees of this facility for this inpatient
visit?" This measure of unofficial payments includes the monetary value of in-kind gifts (in Vietnam
dongs). If the patient's family did not pay any side payments, the variable was recorded as zero.
I observe who does or does not exchange (positive) side payments, and, conditional on paying, the
amount in the transaction. I also report the logarithm of side payment amount since its distribution
is skewed. To minimize underreporting, the respondents had been told that this health survey was
confidential and that their identity would be detached from the answers. If there was systematic
underreporting across the board, what this paper is interested in, the difference between side
6This survey has a module on outpatient care, but side payments in that setting are rare and of small amounts.
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payments for acute and non-acute care, is less subject to this problem than payment levels. Since
some respondents might underreport everything as zero, the estimated difference that I observe in
the data might be smaller than the latent difference. The survey also asks if some side payment
takes place before, during, or after treatment, but only a quarter of the respondents answer this
question. For this sub-sample, side payments seem to take place at all three stages, slightly more
frequently after the treatment, but I do not know precisely how much is exchanged at each stage.
My analysis focuses on public facilities, which handle 96% of inpatient visits. In order to identify
each health facility, I categorize visits into facility identifiers by grouping all visits to the commune
(district, province) facility of people in the same commune (district, province). Facility identifiers
allow me to include facility fixed effects in my regressions to look at variation across visits within
the same hospital. I define a variable called "central cities" as the indicator for the transactions
taking place in Hanoi and HoChiMinh City. These two are principal cities with large population
sizes, administratively equivalent to a province in Vietnam. The central government's operations
and judicial institutions are also housed here.
Another variable of interest to this study is the extent of top-down auditing that would pre-
sumably affect bribe payments in equilibrium. The Vietnam National Health Survey collected data
on grassroots public health care via a commune health facility questionnaire. In this module, I
observe the number of supervision and inspection visits that each facility has received over the 12
months prior to the interview, i.e. the same time period as the data on payments for inpatient
care. Typically during these visits, auditors from the Ministry of Health or the provincial Health
Bureau may inspect the facility's finances, medical reports, general management, or infrastructure.
Places range from one to 80 visits received over one year, with 1 visit per month on average. This
data is available for facilities at the commune only.
Table 1 displays a few descriptive statistics on the hospital visits in my sample. On average,
inpatient-care clients wait for 40 minutes before admission for a clinical intervention, but about 40%
report they do not face any wait time. Patients stay in the hospital for 8 days on average. Half of
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the visits are for chronic cases such as osteoporosis, hypertension, and tooth decay. Acute diseases
such as obstetric complications or heart stroke account for 40% of the visits. Roughly 22% of these
visits involve a positive side payment to doctors and nurses. The mean side payment amount is
24000 dongs while the mean official payment to the facility is 367000 dongs. In particular, Figure
1 shows the mean side payment in the whole sample by illness category. Acute cases are less likely
to pay and pay less than non-acute cases on average. I will investigate this relationship in more
detail in the following section.
The mean annual expenditure per capita for the patient's household is 3652000 dongs, i.e. $281.
Household expenditure is constructed using information on a wide range of food expenditure items
and asset items collected at the household during the same interview. Per capita expenditure is
then the household's total expenditure divided by the household size. Log expenditure will be
used in the analysis as a proxy for permanent income.
3.4 Estimation Strategy and Results
This paper studies side payments for different illness categories to see, in particular, if acute patients
with high willingness to pay actually have to pay more for treatment than non-acute ones. I run
the following regression to estimate this relationship:
Pihf = Oa + -y * Logexph + 31 * Acuteihf + 02 * Injuryihf + 6Xihf + rf + eihf (3.10)
where Pihf is an outcome variable for visit i of household h to facility f. I use four measures of
side payment as dependent variables: (i) side payment amount as reported in the interview, (ii) an
indicator for paying any side payment at all (any strictly positive amount reported), (iii) logarithm
of side payment, and (iv) side payment as a share of total payment. The fourth measure, side
payment divided by the total amount paid to the facility, gives us a sense of bribes as a markup over
the official price. The average share is 11%. Regressions of log side payment have a smaller number
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of observations as they are restricted to the sample with positive bribes. These regressions should
be interpreted with caution due to the sample selection. Acuteihf and Injuryjhf are dummies
for the corresponding illness category associated with each visit. The omitted category is chronic
cases. The coefficients of interest are the P's. Differences in family wealth might drive differences
in payment across illness types if, for example, the rich are less likely to catch acute diseases and
more likely to pay side payments. I control for this possibility by including log expenditure of the
household Logexph as a covariate in all the regressions. Xihf refers to other control variables. I
include official payment in all the regressions of side payment, except when the dependent variable
is side payment as a share of total payment. I will also report some specifications that control
for the length of hospital stay since it may be a proxy for severity. However, bribe payments
may affect the quality of care and, in turn, how long the patient has to be hospitalized, so this
specification is to be interpreted with caution. To account for omitted facility characteristics such
as medical quality or location, my preferred specification of equation 3.10 includes facility fixed
effects rlf. The estimation of /'s comes from variation across visits within health facility. I report
robust standard errors in all the regressions.
Aside from side payment, it is useful to check on allocative efficiency. Constrained resources
are common at Vietnamese hospitals. Patients and families often huddle in the wait room and
outside before and during the treatment. From a social welfare's point of view, acute and injury
cases presumably have the highest social benefits of medical treatment and should be the first ones
to receive treatment. My approach is to test if acute and injury cases actually have to wait less in
equilibrium. I estimate equation 3.10 for a different dependent variable: time spent waiting in the
admission department. Part of this wait time is natural queueing time for a certain illness, and
part of it may represent unnecessary "red tape." As this variable is rightly skewed, I also report
a log transformation of wait time.
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3.4.1 Acute Conditions
Despite having higher perceived private benefits of treatment, acute cases tend to pay smaller bribes
than non-acute ones in my data. Table 2 reports the estimates from running equation 3.10. Each
column is a regression, with the main dependent variables being the four measures of side payment.
For each dependent variable, I present the results from an OLS estimation without facility fixed
effects in the first column, then with the fixed effects. In these regressions, most of the OLS results
are not very different from the fixed effects. The coefficients on "Acute" are consistently negative
and statistically different from zero. Non-acute and non-injury patients pay 28.13 thousand dongs
on average as side payments to doctors and nurses. Relative to those chronic cases brought to
the same facility, acute visits pay on average 9.46 thousand dongs less in bribe (column 2). In
particular, they are 8 percentage points less likely to pay bribe, or if they do, pay 18% less. As
displayed in column 11, side payment in acute situations is 2 percentage points lower as a share
of total payment. These findings are robust to controlling for the length of hospital stay. Injury
cases are also 6 percentage points less likely to pay, and pay 6 percentage points less as a share of
total payment. However, the payment amount by injury patients is not robustly and significantly
smaller than chronic cases.
The results on wait time are indicative of hospitals' sorting behaviors. As shown in column 2
of Table 3, acute cases wait 18 minutes less than chronic cases in the same facility, injury less by 32
minutes. The logarithm specification in columns 4-6 gives similar implications of the results. This
is what we expect if hospitals triage patients in the queue, and allocate urgent cases to treatment
first.
The coefficients on log expenditure in Tables 2 and 3 imply that rich patients tend to pay more
side payments and receive medical interventions sooner. The elasticity of side payment with respect
to household expenditure is 0.27 (column 8 of Table 2). The elasticity of wait time with respect
to household expenditure is -0.13 (column 5 of Table 3). This relationship is robust throughout
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the different specifications presented in this paper. An interesting observation in this data is that
the tendency for the rich to pay more and wait less is strong among chronic illnesses; it is much
weaker or non-existent among acute or injury cases. One possible interpretation is that neglecting
acute patients would cost the doctor so much that any discrimination, if ever existing in regular
practice, is minimized in acute health care.
3.4.2 High-Bribe Locations
This negative relationship between side payment and acute condition in the Vietnam data still
holds at very "greedy" facilities, and is not driven by what happens at places that do not usually
collect much bribe anyway. One way of identifying presumably highly corrupt places is to look at
the regular bribes collected at each location. I define high-bribe locations, denoted by an indicator
Highsp, as facilities where side payments in non-acute, non-injury cases exceed the median positive
amount out of all facilities. The number of observations is slightly smaller for this variable since
some facilities do not have non-acute, non-injury cases reported over this time period. I estimate
the following equation with illness types interacted with high-bribe locations, again with facility
fixed effects.
Pihf = + 7Logexph + /lAcuteihf + 2 2lnjuryihf (3.11)
+O1Acuteihf * Highspf + 02lnjuryihf * Highspf + 6 Xihf + q•f + Cihf (3.12)
The coefficient of interest 01 tells us how the difference in payment for acute and non-acute cases
varies at high-bribe versus low-bribe facilities.
Table 4 reports the estimations of equation 3.11, all with facility fixed effects. Again, richer
patients are associated with higher side payments and lower wait time. In terms of side payment,
the coefficients on the individual term "Acute" are mostly close to zero and statistically insignificant.
This indicates that in low-bribe locations, acute patients tend to pay the same amount of bribe
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as non-acute cases on average. But the coefficients on acute interacted with high-bribe locations
are largely negative and significant at the 1% level. In high-bribe locations relative to low-bribe
locations, acute patients pay much less than non-acute patients, by 31000 dongs on average. They
are 15 percentage points less likely to pay bribes at all, and bribes as a share of the total payment
is 5 percentage points smaller. The log side payment regressions in columns 9-10 have relatively
large standard errors due to the small sample size. These results are not driven by what happens
at commune-level versus district or provincial hospitals since they are robust to controlling for
illness conditions interacted with facility type. Acute patients pay less than non-acute ones even
at otherwise high-bribe hospitals. Thus, greed in terms of bribes collected in one type of care does
not necessarily mean greed in the other.
For injury cases, the evidence is pointing to the same direction. In low-bribe facilities, injury
patients are less likely to pay bribes, but tend to pay roughly the same amount as chronic cases on
average. In high-bribe facilities relative to low-bribe ones, they are 11 percentage points less likely
to pay bribes, and bribes as a share of the total payment are 7 percentage points smaller. Both of
these estimates are statistically significant.
In terms of wait time before admission, both acute and injury visits to high-bribe facilities are
still correlated with earlier treatment than chronic visits. Columns 1-4 of Table 4 report the results
from running equation 3.11 with wait time as the dependent variable. At high-bribe locations,
acute cases wait -12.203 - 14.15 = -26.353 minutes less, injury -30.904 - 5.79 = -36.694 minutes
less, than chronic ones.
3.4.3 Interpretation
These findings that acute patients pay less bribes than non-acute counterparts, even at usually
high-bribe facilities, are intriguing in several ways. One possible interpretation of side payments is
that they represent mostly gift giving from the patient's side. The Ministry of Health claims that
many patients offer informal payments as gifts to health care staff, and this gesture has its cultural
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respect that is inherent to Vietnamese people (Ministry of Health 2003). However, the results
here do not support this claim. If side payment is mainly a manner of gratitude and does not
affect the doctor's efforts, we should expect more (or at least equal) gifts from acute patients than
others since they would be particularly grateful for having their lives saved. I find the opposite,
suggesting that side payment in this context might be a price for treatment.
Considering side payment as a price in the transaction, there would generally be more surplus
to extract from acute or injury cases than otherwise, if the doctor has the same outside option.
This is because acute and injury patients tend to have high private values of treatment. But I
find instead that acute patients pay less bribes than chronic patients. Since the official payments
for acute visits are slightly less than chronic cases within the same hospital, total payments for
acute care are 28% less. These results suggest that the doctor's payoff if not engaged in treating
acute patients is sufficiently low. One possibility is that doctors, even those accepting high side
payments in non-acute care, dislike risking acute patients' lives. They might not mind taking
bribes from patients with a minor toothache, but may be altruistic toward those with a heart
attack. As in the model's framework, the higher is the disutility to the doctor, the lower is
the price charged for acute patients. Alternatively, some doctors with a private practice might
worry about damaged reputation if they refuse to treat acute patients. Outsiders with imperfect
information may attribute the acute patient's death to the doctor's lack of ability.
Another interpretation of the lower bribes observed in acute care is that doctors are responding
to existing incentives against neglecting acute patients. In Vietnam, the prevalence of illegal side
payments suggest that incentives against taking bribes in general health care are weak. However,
incentives against taking bribes in life-threatening situations may be much stronger. Doctors'
promotion decisions, 7 in theory, are made based on qualifications and performance, such as suc-
cessful treatments of difficult cases. Therefore, failure to treat acute cases would cost them more
7In the Vietnamese context, this includes promotion to higher positions within the current hospital, transfer to
another preferred facility, or scholarships for further training abroad in a developed country, all of which would result
in higher expected life-time earnings.
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than failure to treat non-acute ones. The court system provides another channel to hold doctors
accountable. If the health provider insists on bribes in order to treat the patient, an acute patient
who does not pay has a risk of dying. If the patient's family files a law suit for irresponsibility or
malpractice, the doctor and the hospital will have their case examined in court, and often covered
in the news where the judicial system and the media are accessible.8 Even when the hospital and
the patient's family settle outside of court, the health providers' reputation is still affected. In
addition, the Ministry of Health has an auditing division to directly monitor medical practices at
health facilities across the country. I will explore further in the next subsection the possibility that
incentives matter and show some supporting evidence that this interpretation is plausible.
It is not straightforward to make the same argument for injury cases. Official payments for
injury visits are actually higher than chronic cases within the same hospital, so total payments for
injury care are higher by 24%. That is, injury patients pay more in total than chronic patients to
the same health facility, which might already reflect their higher willingness to pay.
3.4.4 High-Incentive Locations
This subsection provides some suggestive evidence that lower side payments for acute care may be
a sign of the doctor's responses to incentives against neglecting these at-risk patients. I compare
payments by illness condition in presumably high-incentive versus low-incentive locations. The
model predicts the difference in payment to be larger at facilities where the incentives are expected
to be stronger. I investigate this hypothesis by estimating an equation similar to equation 3.11,
but the interaction terms are between illness categories and high-incentive locations. I expect the
s Many news articles cover cases of doctors and hospitals being sued, mostly in the two central cities-Hanoi and
HoChiMinh City. The exact statistics on these law suits are not available, so I cite a few examples here. Mrs. Vo
Thi Yen Phi sued HoChiMinh City Medical School Hospital in 2007, after her husband's death post a nose surgery;
the case was brought to a district court since negotiations with the hospital failed. Hoan My hospital, HoChiMinh
City, had to suspend all of its stent procedures in 2006 as a result of an investigation by the Science Committee of
HoChiMinh City, during a law suit by the family of a patient killed after a stent procedure. The Civil Court of
Hanoi settled on a negligence case against Viet Phap Hospital in Hanoi in 2003 after the death of new-born twins
from obstetric complications, whereby the hospital had to provide monetary compensations (VnExpress 2008).
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coefficients on acute visits interacted with high-incentive locations to be negative.
I will present the results using two proxies for high-incentive locations. The first one is an
indicator for the central cities, Hanoi and HoChiMinh City. Recall that these cities are close to the
government's central offices and the court system. It is risky to neglect acute patients here as they
are likely to pursue legal actions. Hospitals in these central cities are also under close scrutiny by
the Ministry of Health. Doctors presumably face high potential punishments, delayed promotion,
or loss of reputation if denying acute care. Second, I use the audit frequency at each facility as
a measure of the amount of monitoring this facility receives. Facilities with more audit visits are
associated with lower side payments overall.
I find that the reduction in side payment associated with acute cases is larger in the central
cities' facilities than in non-central ones. Table 5 reports how the differential side payments
for acute illnesses vary from central to non-central locations. For each dependent variable, I
present the results from two estimations, with and without interactions with high-bribe locations
and interactions with an indicator for provincial/district facilities. The coefficients on "Acute"
imply that in non-central cities, acute patients are 7 percentage points less likely to pay bribes,
and pay slightly less on average. In the central cities, visits for acute care pay even much less
than those for chronic care, by -5.84 - 69.42 = 75.26 thousand dongs. Acute patients at the central
cities' facilities are 27 percentage points less likely to pay bribes than non-acute patients, and pay
9 percentage points less side payment as a share of total payment. As expected, the coefficients on
acute interacted with central locations are negative and statistically significant, except for the log
side payment regressions with a smaller sample in columns 9-10. This finding holds true whether
or not the regressions include additional interaction terms. Similar to the evidence in Table 4, the
coefficients on acute interacted with high-bribe locations remain negative and statistically different
from zero in columns 6, 8, and 12 of Table 5. I cannot make the same case for injury patients,
however. The difference in side payments for injury conditions versus chronic ones does not change
from non-central to central locations.
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As presented in columns 1-4 of Table 5, acute cases wait 18 minutes less at non-central facilities,
but this effect seems to disappear at central facilities. One possible explanation is that large
hospitals in the central cities face excessively high demand. Their triaging system in place is not
very efficient to sort urgent cases to faster care.
Aside from stronger expected incentives, the central cities might also have a larger market for
private practice, affecting doctors' payoffs if acute patients' death damages their reputation. To
get a better picture of incentives, I use a direct measure of monitoring. Table 6 reports the results
on facilities' audit frequency, i.e. the number of supervision visits received over a year. Note that
this measure is available only for the subsample of commune facilities, thus the smaller number
of observations in these regressions. The first interesting observation is that the coefficients on
"Acute" are small and not always distinguishable from zero. Acute patients pay about the same
as non-acute ones at facilities with the lowest supervision. However, in highly audited facilities,
we observe a significantly larger reduction in acute patients' tendency to pay side payment and
in how much they pay informally as a share of total payment. For each additional audit visit a
facility receives, acute patients are 1 percentage point less likely to pay bribe than chronic patients
to that same facility, and pay 0.2 percentage points less bribe as a fraction of total payment. Both
of these estimates are significant at the 1% level. Places with one more supervision visit per year
are associated with 185 dongs less side payment on average in acute relative to non-acute cases.
This estimate in column 5 is not precise (p-value = 0.116). While the findings here do not identify
a causal relationship, it is suggestive of incentives for bureaucrats at work. Acute patients pay
less where doctors face stronger monitoring, thus higher expected punishment for refusing acute
care. As shown in columns 6, 8, and 11, the negative coefficients on acute interacted with high-
bribe locations remain significant in this subsample. The results on injury incidences are again
weak; none of the coefficients on injury interacted with audit visits are statistically significant.
The difference in side payments for injury conditions versus chronic ones does not change across
facilities of different audit frequencies.
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3.5 Conclusion
Corruption in general health care can constrain the extent of the government's service delivery and
redistribution. In principle, primary health care consultations in Vietnam are free for the poor;
they are either exempt or provided with free insurance cards. But in reality, this purpose is partially
defeated if doctors and nurses can request unofficial side payments before treatment. Acute care,
however, is particularly urgent and life-threatening. Even if the public health environment is
overall corrupt, bureaucrats might still charge less bribes from acute patients than from chronic
patients, despite the conjecture that these cases entail high rents that bureaucrats can extract.
In this paper, I study informal payments to doctors and nurses for acute care in Vietnam.
Acute care is of interest since the patients tend to have a high private value of treatment. I first
develop a simple model with the insight that the doctor's expected payoff if neglecting acute cases
may be so poor that they demand less bribes than in non-acute cases. Using data on inpatient
care usage in Vietnam, I exploit variation across visits within hospital and find that acute patients
are 8 percentage points less likely to pay anything above and beyond the official fees to doctors
and nurses. If they do, they pay 18% less side payments than non-acute patients. These findings
are strong even in "greedy" places with relatively high bribes collected among patients of chronic
conditions.
While there can be several interpretations for this negative relationship between bribes and
acute condition, this study provides supporting evidence that doctors may be sensitive to incentives
against neglecting acute patients. I find that facilities that receive more monitoring in terms of
audit visits are associated with a larger reduction in bribes paid by acute visitors. The doctors
seem to respond more where the incentives are expected to be higher. At presumably high-
incentive facilities such as those in the central cities, the differential bribe payment between acute
and non-acute cases is also larger than that at non-central locations.
In conclusion, the data from Vietnam suggests that corrupt activities that risk lives, such as
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those in acute health care, are limited even in a potentially corrupt institution. One plausible
reason explored in this paper is that bureaucrats, even very greedy ones, may be responding to
incentives against such activities.
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Figure 1: Side Payment for Different Illness Categories
Average Side Payment Amount
Notes: Side payment amount is
13000 dongs - 1 USD
measured in 1000 dongs.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Obs
(1) (2) (3)
Wait time (minutes) 39.32 239.28 8085
Length of hospital stay (days) 7.83 8.88 8088
Acute case 0.40 0.49 8096
Injury case 0.12 0.32 8096
Official payment to facility 366.89 1721.10 7850
Side payment amount 23.73 121.24 8060
Pay (positive) side payment 0.22 0.42 8096
District and provincial hospitals (a) 0.84 0.37 8096
Facilities in central cities(b) 0.05 0.22 8096
Household annual expenditure per capita 3652.07 3614.61 8096
Notes: All payment variables are in 1000 dongs. 13000 dongs - 1 USD
(a) Omitted category: Commune facilities (public facilities only)
(b) Central cities are Hanoi and HoChiMinh City
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Table 2: Side Payments for Different Illness Categories
Dependent variables Side Payment Amount Pay Side Payment Log Side Payment Side Payment as % of Total
(Chronic Cases Mean = 28.13) (Chronic Cases Mean = 0.27) (Chronic Cases Mean = 4.05) (Chronic Cases Mean = 0.12)
Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects OLS Effects Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Log expenditure 27.97 25.274 26.752 0.093 0.064 0.066 0.302 0.266 0.279 0.036 0.038 0.042
(6.668)** (10.363)* (10.916)* (0.010)** (0.012)** (0.012)** (0.058)** (0.085)** (0.085)** (0.006)** (0.008)** (0.008)**
Acute -8.969 -9.46 -7.222 -0.096 -0.077 -0.075 -0.034 -0.179 -0.187 -0.021 -0.018 -0.014
(3.790)* (3.689)* (4.4)+ (0.010)** (0.011)** (0.011)** (0.06) (0.077)* (0.078)* (0.007)** (0.008)* (0.008)+
Injury 0.224 -1.002 1.165 -0.05 -0.057 -0.055 0.02 -0.068 -0.066 -0.046 -0.062 -0.059
(4.60) (5.76) (5.44) (0.016)** (0.016)** (0.016)** (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.008)** (0.009)** (0.009)**
Official payment 0.008 0.008 0.006 0 0 0
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log official payment 0.306 0.298 0.282
(0.022)** (0.034)** (0.034)**
Length of hospital stay 1.561 0.002 0.007 0.004
(0.749)* (0.001)* (0.00) (0.001)**
Constant -200.348 -178.132 -202.872 -0.488 -0.259 -0.287 -0.11 0.28 0.214 -0.172 -0.185 -0.246
(54.575)** (84.610)* (94.409)* (0.077)** (0.100)** (0.101)** (0.47) (0.73) (0.73) (0.049)** (0.065)** (0.065)**
Observations 7826 7826 7820 7850 7850 7844 1424 1424 1423 6073 6073 6070
Notes: Omitted illness category is chronic cases, for which
All payment variables are in 1000 dongs. 13000 dongs - 1
"Pay side payment" is an indicator for paying a positive am
Fixed effects regressions include facility fixed effects
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at I
the mean side payments are reported at the top of Table 2.
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Table 3: Wait Time before Admission for Different Illness Categories
Dependent variables Wait (in minutes) LogWait
(Chronic Cases Mean = 49.63) (Chronic Cases Mean = 3.2)
OLS Fixed Effects Fixed Effects OLS Fixed Effects Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log expenditure 0.94 -12.901 -11.791 0.052 -0.131 -0.124
(5.43) (7.93) (7.91) (0.04) (0.053)* (0.053)*
Acute -16.60 -18.08 -16.562 -0.137 -0.101 -0.082
(6.089)** (6.952)** (6.831)* (0.041)** (0.044)* (0.044)+
Injury -20.82 -32.363 -31.28 -0.223 -0.312 -0.296
(8.048)** (10.253)** (10.188)** (0.070)** (0.073)** (0.073)**
Length of hospital stay 1.131 0.01
(0.387)** (0.002)**
Constant 40.94 154.28 135.813 2.778 4.239 4.094
(43.38) (64.641)* (64.307)* (0.319)** (0.430)** (0.432)**
Observations 8085 8085 8077 4243 4243 4240
Notes: Fixed effects regressions include facility fixed effects
Omitted illness category is chronic cases
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
126
Table 4: Differential Side Payments for Acute Illnesses in High-bribe vs. Low-bribe Locations
Dependent variables Side Payment
Wait Log Wait Side Payment Amount Pay Side Payment Log Side Payment as % of Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Log expenditure -13.154 -13.249 -0.13 -0.13 25.824 25.832 0.066 0.066 0.266 0.266 0.038 0.038
(7.969)+ (7.977)+ (0.054)* (0.054)* (10.382)* (10.385)* (0.012)** (0.012)** (0.085)** (0.085)** (0.008)** (0.008)**
Acute -12.203 2.533 -0.008 0.112 2.544 1.272 -0.017 -0.064 -0.068 -0.097 0.004 -0.003
(7.151)+ (3.26) (0.05) (0.13) (1.64) (1.53) (0.01) (0.022)** (0.14) (0.41) (0.01) (0.01)
Acute*High-bribe -14.15 -12.319 -0.221 -0.211 -30.651 -30.811 -0.15 -0.159 -0.156 -0.155 -0.048 -0.049
locations (15.18) (15.36) (0.091)* (0.092)* (7.728)** (7.579)** (0.023)** (0.023)** (0.17) (0.17) (0.016)** (0.017)**
Injury -30.904 -1.792 -0.263 -0.34 0.664 -2.825 -0.008 -0.143 -0.292 -0.215 -0.03 -0.029
(9.582)** (5.89) (0.100)** (0.28) (2.88) (5.50) (0.02) (0.047)** (0.18) (0.73) (0.010)** (0.02)
Injury*High-bribe -5.79 -3.649 -0.101 -0.104 -3.371 -3.617 -0.11 -0.122 0.31 0.31 -0.071 -0.071
locations (22.64) (22.61) (0.15) (0.15) (12.00) (11.89) (0.034)** (0.034)** (0.22) (0.22) (0.019)** (0.019)**
Interactions with
provincial facilities No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Constant 156.913 157.54 4.254 4.253 -182.506 -182.562 -0.273 -0.275 0.282 0.281 -0.19 -0.19
(64.956)* (65.020)* (0.432)** (0.432)** (84.784)* (84.803)* (0.100)** (0.100)** (0.73) (0.73) (0.065)** (0.065)**
Observations 7725 7725 4036 4036 7475 7475 7497 7497 1402 1402 5795 5795
Notes: "Pay side payment" is an indicator for paying a positive amount. All regressions include facility fixed effects
Additional interactions with provincial facilities include interaction terms acute*indicator for provincial/district hospitals and injury*indicator for
Other control variables: regressions in Columns 5-8 include official payment, columns 9-10 include log official payment
Omitted illness category is chronic cases
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
provincial/district hospitals
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Table 5: Differential Side Payments for Acute Illnesses in Central vs. Distant Locations
Dependent variables Side Payment
Wait Log Wait Side Payment Amount Pay Side Payment Log Side Payment as % of Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Log expenditure -13.36 -13.387 -0.134 -0.134 26.063 26.202 0.067 0.068 0.268 0.267 0.039 0.039
(7.991)+ (7.994)+ (0.054)* (0.054)* (10.440)* (10.421)* (0.012)** (0.012)** (0.084)** (0.085)** (0.008)** (0.008)**
Acute -18.532 2.218 -0.115 0.109 -5.84 2.159 -0.067 -0.062 -0.172 -0.09 -0.013 -0.003
(7.191)** (3.23) (0.045)* (0.13) (4.04) (1.59) (0.011)** (0.022)** (0.080)* (0.41) (0.01) (0.01)
Acute*Central cities 14.16 21.119 0.299 0.42 -69.417 -58.625 -0.20 -0.143 -0.1 -0.057 -0.076 -0.057
(21.39) (23.01) (0.23) (0.237)+ (16.149)** (17.875)** (0.049)** (0.050)** (0.27) (0.28) (0.032)* (0.034)+
Injury -33.566 -1.899 -0.323 -0.338 0.361 -2.408 -0.055 -0.141 -0.083 -0.199 -0.063 -0.028
(10.610)** (5.97) (0.076)** (0.28) (5.69) (5.53) (0.016)** (0.047)** (0.11) (0.73) (0.009)** (0.02)
Injury*Central cities 3.26 7.248 0.62 0.684 -9.37 -8.633 0.04 0.083 0.301 0.214 0.044 0.077
(29.27) (33.03) (0.364)+ (0.374)+ (41.17) (41.68) (0.12) (0.12) (0.36) (0.36) (0.06) (0.06)
Acute*High-bribe -14.176 -0.244 -25.615 -0.147 -0.151 -0.044
locations (15.98) (0.094)** (8.360)** (0.024)** (0.17) (0.017)*
Injury*High-bribe -4.383 -0.14 -2.165 -0.124 0.294 -0.074
locations (23.49) (0.15) (11.94) (0.035)** (0.22) (0.020)**
Interactions with
provincial facilities No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Constant 158.747 158.677 4.288 4.281 -184.311 -185.675 -0.276 -0.286 0.285 0.277 -0.194 -0.197
(65.175)* (65.165)* (0.431)** (0.431)** (85.327)* (85.112)* (0.100)** (0.100)** (0.73) (0.73) (0.065)** (0.065)**
Observations 7725 7725 4036 4036 7475 7475 7497 7497 1402 1402 5795 5795
Notes: "Pay side payment" is an indicator for paying a positive amount. All regressions include facility fixed effects
The central cities are Hanoi and HoChiMinh City
Additional interactions with provincial facilities include interaction terms acute*indicator for provincial/district hospitals and injury*indicator for provincial/district hospitals
Other control variables: regressions in Columns 5-8 include official payment, columns 9-10 include log official payment
Omitted illness category is chronic cases
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table 6: Differential Side Payments for Acute Illnesses at Facilities of Different Audit Frequencies
Dependent variables Log Side Side Payment
Wait Log Wait Side Payment Amount Pay Side Payment Payment as % of Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Log expenditure -1.949 -2.146 0.101 0.072 -0.574 -1.806 0.027 0.011 -0.289 0.004 0.0002
(4.51) (4.49) (0.30) (0.31) (2.95) (2.74) (0.05) (0.04) (0.58) (0.02) (0.02)
Acute -1.356 -1.211 -0.254 -0.237 0.236 3.375 0.02 0.067 -0.156 0.014 0.032
(2.96) (3.05) (0.29) (0.31) (2.29) (1.791)+ (0.04) (0.036)+ (1.17) (0.02) (0.017)+
Acute*No. of audits 0.20 0.198 0.047 0.046 -0.185 -0.133 -0.01 -0.008 -0.035 -0.002 -0.002
(0.24) (0.25) (0.04) (0.04) (0.12) (0.11) (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.06) (0.001)** (0.001)**
Injury -1.843 -4.983 -0.225 -0.422 -3.81 -0.587 -0.093 0.012 -0.419 -0.016 0.01
(5.98) (5.12) (0.60) (0.59) (5.16) (3.52) (0.08) (0.07) (3.13) (0.04) (0.04)
Injury*No. of audits -0.13 -0.143 -0.023 -0.014 -0.171 -0.089 -0.01 -0.006 0.035 -0.002 -0.002
(0.37) (0.38) (0.08) (0.08) (0.26) (0.23) (0.01) (0.004) (0.41) (0.002) (0.002)
Acute*High-bribe -1.618 -0.09 -27.091 -0.402 -0.133
locations (5.27) (0.40) (7.835)** (0.105)** (0.041)**
Injury*High-bribe 15.509 0.907 -20.513 -0.613 -0.141
locations (12.21) (0.483)+ (16.62) (0.152)** (0.050)**
Constant 23.039 24.61 1.575 1.804 6.88 16.183 -0.017 0.095 4.045 0.027 0.057
(35.40) (35.23) (2.38) (2.41) (21.60) (19.98) (0.36) (0.34) (4.90) (0.16) (0.16)
Observations 1064 1064 373 373 1051 1051 1051 1051 180 917 917
Notes: "Pay side payment" is an indicator for paying a positive amount. All regressions include facility fixed effects
Number of audits indicates the number of supervision/inspection visits each facility received during the 12 months prior to the interview, same period as the payment data
Regression of log side payment including high-bribe interaction terms (not reported) has highly colinear covariates and gives the same results as in column 9
Other control variables: regressions in Columns 5-8 include official payment, columns 9 include log official payment
Omitted illness category is chronic cases
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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